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“Personal data is the new oil of the internet and the new currency of the digital world”1 
 
 
The proliferation of computer systems and Information and Communications Technology 
(ICT) from the 1970s prompted law makers around the world to begin developing data 
protection laws to protect personal information or data
2
 and the right to privacy.
3
 Data 
protection laws have a uniform objective to regulate the processing of personal information 
or data
4




A substantial portion of global trade is centred around the use of personal data, which 
is regarded as the ‘new oil’ of online activity by virtue of the large volumes of personal 
information processed across the world
6
 due to rapid developments in information 
technology.
7
 This resulted in heightened interest in data privacy
8







 M Kuneva ‘Keynote Speech SPEECH/09/156’ (Roundtable on Online Data Collection, Targeting and 
Profiling)’ available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-09-156_en.htm, accessed on 30 March 
2019.  
2
 The terms ‘personal information’ and ‘personal data’ are used synonymously throughout this dissertation. 
‘Personal information’ is defined in section 1 of the POPIA. See further article by A Roos 'Data Protection: 
Explaining the International Backdrop and Evaluating the Current South African Position’ (2007) 124(2) SALJ 
401, where she draws a distinction between these two terms. She explains that ‘data’ is defined as “unstructured 
facts or raw material that needs to be processed and organized to produce information,” whereas ‘information’ 
refers to “data that are organized, structured and meaningful to the recipient position.”  
3 Ibid at 403. The Federal State of Hesse in Germany passed the first data protection law in 1970, followed by 
national laws in several other states such as Sweden (1973), the United States (1974), Germany (1977) and 
France (1978).
  
4 A Roos 'Data Protection: Explaining the International Backdrop and Evaluating the Current South African 
Position’ (note 2 above) 402.
  
5 P Hustnix ‘EU Data Protection Law: The Review of Directive 95/46/EC and the General Data Protection’ in  
Cremona M et al (ed) New Technologies and EU Law 1ed Oxford (2017) 123-172. 
6 This phenomenon is often referred to as transborder data flows. See A Roos 'Data Protection: Explaining the  
International Backdrop and Evaluating the Current South African Position’ (note 2 above) 403. 
7 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development ‘Data Protection Regulations and International Data  
Flows: Implications for Trade and Development’ available at 
https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/dtlstict2016d1_summary_en.pdf, accessed on 10 April 2019. 
8 The terms ‘data protection and ‘data privacy’ are used synonymously throughout this dissertation. See Chapter  
2, paragraph 2.1 for a discussion on these terms. See also A Roos ‘Data Privacy Law’ in D Van der Merwe, A 
Roos, T Pistorius, S Eiselen and S Nel (eds) Information and Communications Technology Law 2ed 2016 368, 
where it is explained that “[D]ata privacy law can thus be defined as a set of measures aimed at safeguarding 







development of three key international instruments.
9
 The effects of technological 
advancements on data privacy raise various concerns.
10
 It is likely that by the end of 2020, 
50 billion devices will have wireless connection to the internet.
11
 In light of rapid 
technological developments, there has been a boom in data protection regulation with 126 
countries having enacted data protection laws as at June 2018.
12 
 
In South Africa (SA), the right to privacy is protected by the common law
13
 and is 
entrenched as a fundamental human right in terms of the Constitution.
14
 The South African 
government realised that current protection was not adequate, and acknowledged the need for 
specific data protection legislation to address the surveillance potential of modern 
computerised systems and databases.
15
 In order to bring SA on par with its international 
counterparts, in 2005, the South African Law Reform Commission (SALRC) was mandated 
to investigate data privacy in instances where personal data is processed by the State or other 
persons and to recommend legislative steps which should be taken in this regard.
16 
 
Although SA was slow to introduce data protection legislation, an advantage is that it 
is able to learn from and reflect on legislation adopted by other jurisdictions.
17
 Burchell 





9 The first two international instruments that were enacted in 1980 are the Council of Europe’s Convention for 
the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data and the OECD Guidelines 
Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data. The third international instrument 
that aims to protect personal data is the EU Directive on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of such Data which was passed in 1995.
  
10 “The emergence of new, evolving and emerging computer and ICT have fuelled data privacy concerns due to 
the size and amount of data that can be collected, the speed of such collection, improved storage capacities, 
increased potential of manipulation of personal data as well as the ease with which personal information can be 
shared across the globe and social media.” See AB Makulilo African Data Privacy Laws in Law, Governance 
and Technology Series 1ed (2017) 3.
  
11 World Economic Forum ‘Data Policy in the Fourth Industrial Revolution: Insights on personal data’ 
available at https://www.weforum.org/whitepapers/data-policy-in-the-fourth-industrial-revolution-insights-on-
personal-data, accessed on 01 April 2019.  
12 Global Convergence of Data Privacy Standards and Laws: ‘Speaking Notes for the European Commission 
Events on the Launch of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in Brussels & New Delhi’ available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3184548, accessed on 10 April 2019.  
13 At common law, the delictual protection of the right to privacy enjoys recognition as an independent right of 
personality. Refer to Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion on the data protection regime in SA.
  
14 Section 14 (d) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act No. 108 of 1996 (hereinafter referred to 
as “the Constitution”) (which took effect on 4 February 1997) provides that “Everyone has the right to privacy, 
which includes… the right not to have the privacy of their communications infringed.”
 
15 South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 109 (Project 124) ‘Privacy and Data protection’  
(2005) iv available at https://www.justice.gov.za/salrc/dpapers/dp109.pdf, accessed on 04 June 2019. 
16 Ibid at 13.  






Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) guidelines.
18
 In 2009, the 
SALRC published a final report, entitled “Privacy and Data Protection Project 124 Report” 
(“SALRC Final Report”).
19
 It recommended that specific data protection legislation be 
enacted in the form of the Protection of Personal Information Bill B 9D – 2009 which 
contained eight principles aligned to the OECD guidelines. 
 
 
The much-awaited Protection of Personal Information Act No. 4 of 2013 (POPIA) 
was signed into law on 19 November 2013.
20
 Its overall objective is to give effect to the 
constitutional right to privacy. The purpose of the POPIA is to inter alia, safeguard the 
processing
21
 of personal information
22
 by public and private bodies and to provide for an 
Information Regulator to exercise certain powers and functions in terms of the POPIA and the 
Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000.
23
 However, to date, not all the POPIA 
provisions have come into effect.
24
 The surge in data growth since the partial promulgation 
of the POPIA prompted the Information Regulator to request that the President bring the 
remaining provisions of this Act into force and effect from 1 April 2020.
25 
 
Effective enforcement of the POPIA depends on the Information Regulator being 
fully operational to actively carry out its mandate when the remaining provisions of the Act 
come into force and effect.
26
 The Information Regulator was appointed by the National 
Assembly on 09 September 2016, as a juristic person to serve as the core supervisory body 





18 Ibid at 14-15.  
19 The South African Law Reform Commission Project 124 ‘Privacy and Data Protection Report’ dated 
2009 available at 
https://www.justice.gov.za/salrc/reports/r_prj124_privacy%20and%20data%20protection2009.pdf, accessed on 
15 June 2019.  
20 No. 4 of 2013 published in GN 912 in GG 37067 of 26 November 2013.  
21 The term ‘processing’ is defined in Section 1 of the POPIA.  
22 See section 1 of the POPIA for the definition of ‘personal information’, which is broadly defined to include 
various categories of personal information relating to an identifiable living natural person and an existing 
juristic person. Note further that the POPIA defines a “person” in section 1 to include reference to both natural 
persons or juristic persons.
  
23 Section 2 of the POPIA sets out its purpose.  
24 A proclamation published on 11 April 2014 declared that certain sections of the POPIA will become effectual 
as at the date of such publication, namely, section 1 (definitions); Part A of Chapter 5 (establishment, duties and 
powers of the Information Regulator) and sections 112 and 113 (empowering provisions for the Minister of 
Justice and Constitutional Development to issue regulations and the procedure to be followed thereto).
  
25 ‘The waiting game is over for PoPI Act’ IOL 17 February 2020 available at 
https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/economy/the-waiting-game-is-over-for-popi-act-42881708, accessed on 
03 March 2020.  
26 Section 114 (1) of the POPIA contains transitional arrangements where persons (private and public) 
undertaking all forms of processing of personal information are required to comply with the POPIA within one 







personal data is concerned. 
27
 The Information Regulator is granted extensive powers and 
functions to ensure that personal data is processed lawfully by applying the principles set 
down in the POPIA.
28




To ensure effective implementation of the POPIA, the Information Regulator published 
Regulations
30
 (“POPIA Regulations”) on 08 September 2017. These are mostly procedural in 
nature, but, it is noteworthy that an Information Officer
31
 appointed by a public or private body is 
required to conduct a personal information impact assessment with adequate measures and 






Data privacy has always centred around the evolution of technologies and data protection 




 are referred to by 
different names in foreign jurisdictions, including Regulator,
35

















27 The Information Regulator is established in terms of section 39 of the POPIA.  
28 The scope of the Information Regulator’s duties, powers and functions are fully set out in section 40 of the  
POPIA.  
29 Section 41(1)(a) (i) and (ii) sets out the composition and eligibility criteria for members appointed by the 
Information Regulator who must be suitably qualified, fit and proper. At least one of the members must be a 
practising attorney or a professor of law at a university and the remainder of the members must be appointed 
taking into account their qualifications, experience and expertise relating to the objectives of the Information 
Regulator. This section further sets out the term of appointment of the Chairperson and other members of the 
Information Regulator.
  
30 Regulations relating to the Protection of Personal Information, 2017, published in accordance with section 
112(2) of the POPIA - GN R 2017 in GG 41105 (not yet proclaimed).
  
31 An ‘Information Officer’ is specifically defined in section 1 of the POPIA.  
32 Regulation 4(1)(b) of the POPIA Regulations.  
33 European Data Protection Supervisor ‘Technology Monitoring’ available at https://edps.europa.eu/data-
protection/our-work/technology-monitoring_en, accessed on 13 April 2019. 
34 This dissertation uses the term ‘DPAs’ to refer to foreign data protection regulators.  
35 The POPIA uses the term “Information Regulator” and as such this dissertation uses this term in discussions 
on South African law and the POPIA.
  
36 The DPA in Australia is referred to as the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner and in 
Canada the DPA is referred to as the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada.  
37 The DPA in Estonia is referred to as the Estonian Data Protection Inspectorate.  
38 The DPA in Argentina is referred to as the National Directorate for Personal Data Protection.  
39 The DPA in Belgium is referred to as the Data Protection Authority and in Hungary the DPA is referred to as 
the National Authority for Data Protection and Freedom of Information.
 






In the wake of the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR),
41
 new digital technologies have 
the ability to process an exorbitant amount of personal data on a daily basis.
42
 By their very 
nature, digital technologies have revolutionised the ability to copy, interlink, compare, 
combine and collect an enormous amount of personal data without a data subject’s
43
 consent, 
thereby directly contributing to loss of control over his or her data privacy.
44
 Automatic 
processing of personal data using technologies increases the chances of intercepting, sharing, 
storing, accessing and selecting such information.
45
 Certain personal information is collected 
“surreptitiously by technological inventions” without the knowledge of the data subject.
46 
 
New wireless technology such as mobile communication networks which enable 
geographic location of mobile devices can also intrude on privacy if used as location-based 
advertising. The latest technologies such as cloud computing
47
 and big data
48
 pose bigger 
challenges to data privacy. Individuals do not have control of their personal information in 
the cloud, which can be stored on various servers anywhere in the world. The manner of the 
processing, the place at which processing occurs and the identity of the party undertaking 
such processing are thus unknown. Big data is regarded as contrary to data privacy principles 





41 The 4IR can be described as “the advent of ‘cyber-physical systems’ involving entirely new 
capabilities for people and machines which represents entirely new ways in which technology becomes 
embedded within societies and even our human bodies”. Examples include genome editing, new forms of 
machine intelligence, breakthrough materials and approaches to governance that rely on cryptographic methods 
such as the blockchain. See World Economic Forum ‘What is the Fourth Industrial Revolution?’ available at 
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/what-is-the-fourth-industrial-revolution/, accessed on 10 April 2019.  
42 ISACA ‘Enforcing Data Privacy in the Digital World’ available http://www.isaca.org/Knowledge-
Center/Research/ResearchDeliverables/Pages/Enforcing-Data-Privacy-in-the-New-Digital-World.aspx, 
accessed on 13 April 2019. 
43 Section 1 of the POPIA defines a “data subject” as “a person to whom the personal information relates.”  
44 J Van den Hoven et al ‘Privacy and Information Technology’ (2018) The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy 3 available at https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/it-privacy/, accessed on 16 April 
2019.  
45 D Van der Merwe et al Information Communications Technology Law 2ed (2016) 365.  
46 Examples of technological inventions include cookies, radio frequency identification, and the use of scanners 
on mobile devices where Wi-Fi or Blue Tooth is activated to collect personal data. See D Van der Merwe et al 
Information Communications Technology Law (note 45 above) 365.
  
47 Cloud computing is defined as “a style of computing in which scalable and elastic IT-enabled 
capabilities are delivered as a service using internet technologies.” See Gartner Glossary available at 
https://www.gartner.com/en/information-technology/glossary/cloud-computing, accessed on 11 July 2019. See 
further D Van der Merwe et al Information Communications Technology Law (note 45 above) 366, where the 
author explains that “a cloud computing service provider can offer various services such as data storage space as 
well as software applications to multiple customers on demand. In other words, instead of storing data and 
software on a user’s hard drive, it is now stored on various servers which could be located anywhere in the 
world and accessed, when needed, via the Internet.”  
48 Big Data is defined as “the creation and analysis of massive data sets. Data collected in one area can be linked 
to data collected in other areas and the data can then be analysed to produce new inferences.” For example, data 







the consent of the person to whom the personal data relates.
49
 Furthermore, the Internet of 
Things
50
 creates risks associated with poor security measures, exposing the data subject to 
data losses, unlawful or unauthorised access to personal information, unlawful surveillance, 
and infection by malware.
51 
 
With technology constantly evolving, data protection laws will need to keep pace to 
ensure that legal protection of data privacy remains adequate for DPAs to meaningfully 
enforce compliance. The focus of this research is therefore limited to sections 40(1) (b)(ii)
52
 
and 40(e)(i) and (ii)
53
 of the POPIA, which broadly encompass the specific duties, functions 
and powers of the Information Regulator to research and monitor developments in 
technology, undertake research, and propose to Parliament that SA accepts any international 
instrument, or makes necessary legislative amendments aimed at protecting personal 
information. These powers and functions are important in ensuring that the Information 
Regulator is proactive in facilitating improved regulatory protection of personal information 
by addressing the data privacy challenges posed by new or emerging technologies. 
 
Against this background, this research addresses how the Information Regulator will 
execute its mandate to manage and control advancements in technology to minimise its 
adverse effects on data protection. Accordingly, it explores the regulation of data protection 
in SA, data protection laws adopted in foreign jurisdictions, and academic discourses and 




and online purchase information. See D Van der Merwe et al Information Communications Technology Law 
(note 45 above) 366. 
49 Ibid at 367.  
50 The Internet of Things is defined as “an infrastructure in which billions of sensors embedded in common, 
everyday devices – ‘things’ as such, or things linked to other objects or individuals – are designed to record, 
process, store and transfer data and, as they are associated with unique identifiers, interact with other devices or 
systems using networking capabilities.” These everyday devices include, amongst others, television, exercise 
equipment and appliances. See the European Union’s Article 29 Data Protection Working Party ‘Opinion
  
8/2014 on Recent Developments on the Internet of Things’ WP 223 (2014) available at 
https://www.dataprotection.ro/servlet/ViewDocument?id=1088, accessed on 20 July 2019. See further D Van 
der Merwe et al Information Communications Technology Law (note 45 above) 368.  
51 D Van der Merwe et al Information Communications Technology Law (note 45 above) 368.  
52 Section 40(1)(b)(ii) of the POPIA encompasses the Information Regulator’s mandate to “monitor and enforce 
compliance by undertaking research into, and monitoring developments in, information processing and 
computer technology to ensure that any adverse effects of such developments on the protection of the personal 
information of data subjects are minimised, and reporting to the Minister the results of such research and 
monitoring.”
  
53 Section 40(e)(i) and (ii) of the POPIA deals specifically with the Information Regulator’s duty to “conduct 
research and to report to Parliament, from time to time on the desirability of the acceptance, by South Africa, of 
any international instrument relating to the protection of the personal information of a data subject;” and “on 
any other matter, including necessary legislative amendments, relating to protection of personal information 








research is to investigate the approach followed by foreign jurisdictions to address new data 
privacy challenges posed by technological developments. 
 
1.3.  STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
 
 
This dissertation assesses and evaluates the manner in which the Information Regulator will 
discharge its powers, duties and functions in terms of section 40(1)(b)(ii) of the POPIA. It 
examines the data protection legal regimes in SA and foreign jurisdictions such as the 
European Union (EU), United Kingdom (UK) and New Zealand (NZ) in order to determine if 
amendments are required to the POPIA, which the Information Regulator is mandated to 
consider in line with section 40(e) of this Act. 
 
 
Overall, this dissertation assesses whether, in its current form, the POPIA is adequate 
to manage and control the adverse effects of technological advancements as well as the role 
of the Information Regulator to monitor and enforce compliance in this regard. Based on an 
analysis of developments in foreign data protection regimes, it also proposes 
recommendations for consideration by the Information Regulator to bring the POPIA Act in 
line with such developments. 
 
 
1.4.  RATIONALE 
 
 
Technology is evolving at a rapid pace in the era of the 4IR. In order to remain 
effective and adequate, the data protection regulatory landscape will need to be reviewed and 
updated. The POPIA’s key purpose is to uphold the constitutional right to privacy by 
ensuring that, notwithstanding advancements in technology, data privacy is not sacrificed. 
The Information Regulator is therefore empowered to prevent technological developments 
from impairing the right to privacy. In anticipation of the Information Regulator being robust 
in executing its mandate in terms of the POPIA, scholarly research and dialogue has occurred 
in SA on inter alia, the level of compliance required in terms of the POPIA to avoid the 
consequences of non-compliance. However, limited scholarly research or dialogue has 
focused specifically on the Information Regulator’s mandate in terms of Sections 40(1)(b)(ii) 
and 40(e) of the POPIA. 
 
The practical application and enforcement of the POPIA is currently not known. This 







conduct research into and monitor developments in technology by examining developments 
in foreign jurisdictions which address the data privacy challenges associated with the 
evolving technological landscape. 
 
 
1.5. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
 
1.5.1 How does South African law regulate data protection to safeguard the right to 
privacy? Is the regulatory landscape effective in the era of constant technological 
developments to adequately protect a data subject’s right to privacy? 
 
 
1.5.2 Does the POPIA contain adequate provisions and enforcement mechanisms to guard 
against the adverse effects of new technologies used to process personal information? 
Is the current penalty regime provided for in the POPIA effective in this regard? 
 
 
1.5.3 What are the regulatory powers, duties and functions of the Information Regulator in 
terms of the POPIA to ensure that the protection of personal information is minimally 
affected by technological developments? 
 
 
1.5.4 In comparison to South African law, what are the obligations of foreign data 
protection regulators to monitor and address challenges to data protection associated 
with advancements in technology? Are there any new developments in foreign data 
protection law to minimise the challenges posed by new technologies? 
 
1.5.5 How can the Information Regulator afford better protection and enforce compliance in 
response to technological developments? Can this be achieved by enhancing the 
current regulatory landscape to pre-empt and mitigate the adverse effects new 
technologies will have on the protection of personal information in South Africa? 
 
1.6. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Taking into account the research topic, the research questions, the literature reviewed and the 
data collection methodology, this research adopts the positivist approach to assess the 
challenges new technologies pose to the protection of personal information. This approach is 










principles formulated under South African and foreign law. The dissertation focusses on the 
written law as it is, without reliance on the morality of the actions taken by countries. 
 
1.7. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
 
A desktop based research method was employed to review legislation, case law, journal 
articles and other academic sources relevant to data protection. Both primary and secondary 
sources of data housed in libraries and via electronic sources were consulted. Substantial 
































































In SA, the right to privacy is protected by the Constitution as a fundamental human right,
54
 as 
well as by the common law and the POPIA,
55
 which, once in full effect, will provide an 
omnibus form of data protection.
56
 The Constitutional Court described the right to privacy as 
“the right to be left alone.”
57
 In particular, the South African courts
58
 have accepted the 
definition of privacy coined by Neethling, which provides as follows: 
 
Privacy is an individual condition of life characterised by exclusion from the public and 
publicity. This condition embraces all those personal facts which the person concerned has 
determined himself to be excluded from the knowledge of outsiders and in respect of which he 
has the will that they be kept private.59 
 
This definition suggests that privacy rights extend to data privacy,
60
 where an 
individual should be able to control his or her personal data by conducting personal affairs 
without any unlawful interference.
61
 Bygrave is of the view that data privacy touches on 





 expanded the right to privacy to information (data) privacy 
by strongly asserting that the right to privacy is not only in relation to an individual’s intimate 
 
 
54 Section 14 of the Constitution.  
55 The POPIA is not yet in full force and effect.  See discussion under Chapter 1, paragraph 1.1 above.  
56 A Roos ‘Data Protection Law in South Africa’ in AB Makulilo African Data Privacy Laws: Springer (2017)  
194.  
57 NM and Others v Smith and Others (Freedom of Expression Institute as Amicus Curiae) 2007 (7) BCLR 751 
(CC) 32; Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others v Prince (Clarke and Others 
Intervening); National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others v Acton (CCT108/17) [2018] ZACC 30; 
2018 (10) BCLR 1220 (CC); 2018 (6) SA 393 (CC); 2019 (1) SACR 14 (CC) where Zondo ACJ confirmed that 
the “right to privacy is a right to be left alone.”
  
58 Jooste v National Media Ltd 1994 (2) SA 634 (C) at 645; Universiteit van Pretoria v Tommie Meyer Films 
(Edms) Bpk 1977 (4) SA 376 (T) at 384; Bernstein v Bester NO 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) at 789; Swanepoel v 
Minister van Veiligheid en Sekuriteit 1999 (4) SA 549 (T) at 553.
  
59 J Neethling Die Reg op Privaatheid (LLD thesis Unisa 1976) 287; J Neethling et al Neethling’s Law of 
Personality 2 ed (2005) 32.
  
60 The term ‘data privacy’ does not feature in any case law or adopted data protection legal instrument but it has 
been commonly used in the academic literature, mainly to single out the critical issue at stake emanating from 
the risks posed by technologies.
 
61 J Neethling Die Reg op Privaatheid (LLD thesis Unisa 1976) (note 59 above) at 1.2.1.  
62 LA Bygrave Data Privacy Law: An International Perspective (2014) 3. See also A Roos ‘Data Privacy Law’ 
(note 8 above) 367, where she explains that “data privacy law can this be defined as a set of measures aimed at 
safeguarding data subjects from harm resulting from the computerised or manual processing of their personal 
information by data controllers.”
  
63 Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences and others v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and 







space and proceeded to criticise the decision taken by the court in Bernstein v Bester
64
 on the 
basis that, there is movement away from a person’s intimate core as privacy is no longer 
retained in the interaction of social capabilities.65 This case demonstrates the willingness of 
the Constitutional Court to protect the right to data privacy, specifically in the light of 
technological advances, which increase the capability to collect, intercept or disseminate 
personal information without an individual’s consent and therefore without their control, 
thereby directly impacting on the protection of such right. 
 
 
In the face of rapid technological advancements, at the heart of this discussion is the 
assertion that protection of data privacy by SA law should be adequate to safeguard data 
subjects from the risks emanating from the unlawful processing of their personal data and 
further to ensure that they have active control over the use of, collection or disclosure of their 
personal information. This Chapter therefore examines the effectiveness of the current data 
protection legal regime in SA. In so doing, the country’s common law, the Constitution and 
the POPIA are critically analysed to contextualise the level of protection afforded to data 
privacy in SA. 
 
 




2.2.1 Privacy Protection 
 
 
In general, privacy is protected as an independent right of personality under the law of 
delict.
66
 Watermeyer J, in O'Keeffe v Argus Printing and Publishing Co Ltd,
67
 broadened the 
meaning of the concept of dignitas to encompass all aspects of the personality rights which 
are protected, with the exception of bodily integrity (corpus) and reputation (fama).
68
 
Therefore, the collective nature of the concept of dignitas integrates the right to privacy with 




64 Supra note 58.  
65 Ibid at 16. The Constitutional Court expanded on the definitional nature of the right to data privacy by 
asserting that “when people are in their offices, in their cars or on mobile telephones, they still retain a right to 
be left alone by the state unless certain conditions are satisfied …Wherever a person has the ability to decide 
what he or she wishes to disclose to the public and the expectation that such a decision will be respected is 
reasonable, the right to privacy will come into play.”
  
66 A Roos ‘Personal data protection in New Zealand: lessons for South Africa?’ (2008) 4 Potchefstroom 
Electronic Law Journal 90.
  
67 1954 (3) SA 244(C).  







to be afforded, the test is subjective, in that a person must determine whether his or her 
private information should not be disclosed to others.
69 
 
Hence, at common law, a third party will be liable for invading the privacy of another if 
the violation of information is secret, private or confidential in nature. Neethling is of the 
opinion that the right to privacy embodied as a personality right is not absolute, but is limited 
by the lawful interests of others and interests of the public.
70
 The common law, therefore, 
does not recognise privacy as a separate right and the test for infringement thereof is too 
subjective to afford a person a high degree of protection from privacy intrusions. For 
instance, since personal data is regarded as a valuable commodity, it can be argued that the 
right to data privacy itself may be limited by the financial interests of the company exploiting 
the personal information for commercial gain or it may be in the public interest, leaving the 
aggrieved party without effective legal redress. 
 
 
2.2.2 Remedies for Privacy Infringements 
 
 
Unlawful processing of personal data by technological means infringes data privacy when the 
personal data is used, collected, stored or disclosed without a person’s knowledge or consent 
or when security measures fail to prevent the disclosure thereof.
71
 It has been argued that the 
South African common law has taken a casuistic approach to privacy covering categories of 
privacy infringements, such as unreasonable or unlawful intrusion of a person’s private space 
or publically disclosing private facts about a person.
72 
 
Therefore, privacy infringements amount to an iniuria, for which remedies are available to 
a person seeking relief under the law of delict as follows: - 
 
 
(a) actio iniuriarum 
 
Under the requirements of the actio iniuriarum, a claim for non-patrimonial loss may be 




69 J Neethling et al Neethling’s Law of Personality (note 59 above) 240.  
70 J Neethling et al Neethling’s Law of Personality (note 59 above) 281.  
71 SALRC Final Report (note 19 above) 19.  
72 JM Burchell Principles of Delict 1ed (1993) 208. See further, Financial Mail (Pty) Ltd v Sage Holdings 
Ltd (1993) ZASCA 3; 1993 2 SA 451 (A) 462F, where the court identified two instances of privacy invasion, 
namely, “an unlawful intrusion upon the personal privacy of another or the unlawful publication of private facts 








 Hence, the defendant’s negligence alone does not attract liability in 
terms of the law of delict. Wrongfulness is determined by weighing up the conduct with the 
boni mores; if the boni mores regards such as unreasonable, the conduct will be regarded as 
wrongful.
74
 The defendant will need to rebut two presumptions, namely, that the conduct is 
wrongful and conducted intentionally.
75
 These presumptions can further be rebutted if the 
defendant can prove it was done mistakenly.
76
 Since certain technologies are used to process 
personal data without a plaintiff’s consent or knowledge, this remedy can only be invoked if 
the plaintiff is aware of the wrongful and intentional conduct of unlawful processing of his or 
her personal information. 
 
 
(b) actio legis aquiliae 
 
 
The plaintiff can claim patrimonial loss for the processing of personal information which 
occurred wrongfully, intentionally or negligently, thereby infringing the plaintiff’s right to 
privacy. Unlike the actio iniuriarum, under the aquilian action, negligence is sufficient to 






An interdict is available to avert the wrongful processing of personal information or to 
prevent the continuation thereof.
78 
 
From the foregoing, the common law and its remedies do not afford a person an 
element of control over their personal data.
79
 Neethling convincingly argues that the 






73 A Roos 'Data Protection: Explaining the International Backdrop and Evaluating the Current South African 
Position’ (note 2 above) 197.
  
74 Ibid.  
75 A Roos ‘Data Protection Law in South Africa’ (note 56 above), explains with reference to Neethling’s Law of 
Personality that “the presumption of wrongfulness can be rebutted by proving that a ground of justification, 
such as private defence, necessity, provocation, consent to injury and exercise of a statutory right or official 
authority was present…the presumption of intent can be rebutted by proving that the publication was done 
mistakenly.”
  
76 J Neethling et al Neethling’s Law of Personality (note 59 above) 63.  
77 Ibid at 254.  
78 Ibid.  






processing of personal data and that statutory data protection is required.
80
 Neethling calls 
for “active control principles” 
81
 which are deficient in the common law protection of 




In my view, the common law is deficient to specifically protect data privacy 
infringements in that case law applying the common law principles demonstrates that liability 
for infringing the right to privacy is confined to information (not necessarily personal 
information) which a person perceives to be private. The common law does not allow an 
individual to actively take control of his or her personal information. In light of the challenges 
posed by technological advancements, a further downside to the delictual principles is that a 




2.3 CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION 
 
 
Constitutional protection of a person’s privacy emanates from the fundamental right not to 
have the privacy of their communications infringed,
83
 which is of particular importance to 
data protection.
84
 Currie and De Waal focussed on the Mistry v Interim Medical and Dental 
Council of South Africa case and noted that the Constitutional Court expanded on the privacy 
rights contained in the Constitution to protect “informational self-determination”.
85
 Cases 
involving the violation of data privacy have not been extensively dealt with by the 
Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court in Mistry v Interim Medical and Dental 
Council of South Africa
86
 attempted to formulate guidelines to determine if there has been an 
infringement of data privacy. 
 
 
However, the Constitution merely creates a broad framework for data privacy. A full 




80 J Neethling et al Neethling’s Law of Personality (note 59 above) 281.  
81 J Neethling et al Neethling’s Law of Personality (note 59 above) 278.  
82 A Roos ‘Data Protection Law in South Africa’ (note 56 above) 200.  
83 Section 14(d) of the Constitution.  
84 In Mistry v Interim Medical and Dental Council of South Africa 1998 (4) SA 1127 (CC), it was held that 
although not expressly stated in the then section 13 of the Interim Constitution, the right to informational 
privacy is covered by the broad protection of privacy guaranteed by section 13.
  
85 I Currie et al The Bill of Rights Handbook 6ed (2013) 302-303. The authors explain that informational self-
determination is “an interest in restricting the collection, use of and disclosure of personal information.”
  











2.4 STATUTORY DATA PROTECTION 
 
 
2.4.1 Sectoral-specific legislation 
 
 
Sectoral laws enacted in the form of the PAIA,
87
 the Electronic Communications and 
Transactions Act No. 25 of 2002 (ECTA)
88
 and the National Credit Act (NCA)
89
 provide 
limited protection of data privacy in SA.
90
 Although the PAIA
91
 gives effect to data privacy 
by enabling persons to access and correct their personal information contained in manual and 





The main objective of the ECTA is to protect the public interest by facilitating 
electronic communications and transactions.
93
 This Act does not impose mandatory 
obligations on data controllers, compliance with section 51 is voluntary, no independent 
supervisory body exists and there are no criminal penalties to enforce compliance with the 
principles.
94




In respect of the NCA, “confidential information”
95
 is defined to include personal 
information. However, data protection in the NCA is confined to the consumer credit 
industry.
96
 As with the ECTA, the lacuna in the NCA is that it does not contain specific data 






87 No. 2 of 2000.  
88 No. 25 of 2002.  
89 No. 34 of 2005.  
90 A Roos 'Data Protection: Explaining the International Backdrop and Evaluating the Current South 
African Position’ (note 2 above) 424.
  
91 One of the objectives of the PAIA set out in section 9(b)(1) is to “give effect to the constitutional right of 
access to any information held by the state or by another person - subject to justifiable limitations, including, 
but not limited to, limitations aimed at the reasonable protection of privacy.”
 
92 Ibid.  
93 Section 2(1) of the ECTA.  
94 A Roos ‘Data Protection Law in South Africa’ (note 56 above) 428-429.  
95 Section 1 of the NCA.  







The protection afforded by the sectoral legislation referred to above offers rather 
fragmented protection of data privacy. The broader yet more specific protection of personal 
information was therefore assessed against sectoral legislation to guard against over-
regulation but also to ensure that the generic protection of a data protection regulatory regime 
is implemented in tandem with sector specific legislation.
97 
 
2.4.2 Specific Data Protection: The POPIA 
 
 
2.4.2.1 Overview of the POPIA 
 
 
A brief background of the enactment of the POPIA is presented in Chapter 1 above.
98
 The 
focus of the discussion here is the specific provisions of this Act that aim to safeguard the 
constitutionally protected right to data privacy.
99
 It is apt to note that greater legislative 
protection is required to counteract vulnerabilities to privacy caused by the disruption of the 
economic climate facilitated by global trade and technological developments.
100
 The effects 
of the current technological era on personal data were noted by Willis J in H v W,
101
 who 
contended that the common law needs to be developed where infringements of privacy take 




The journey to the POPIA commenced with the SALRC embarking on a lengthy and 
time-consuming process to investigate legislative reform.
103
 With a focus on the 
technological risks that impact personal data protection, the SALRC highlighted that the ease 
of electronic communication through the modes of ICT and the internet, increased privacy 










97 SALRC’s Discussion Paper 109 (Project 124) (note 15 above) 396.  
98 See Chapter 1, paragraph 1.1 above.  
99 The SALRC Final Report (note 19 above) at 3.3.43 explains that “the aim of privacy legislation is not to stem 
the flow of information, but to regulate it.”
  
100 Y Burns and A Burger-Smidt A Commentary on the Protection of Personal Information Act (note 68 above) 4-5. 
 
101 (2013) 2 All SA 218 (GSJ).  
102 Ibid at 21.  
103 The SALRC Final Report (note 19 above) at 1.3.1.  







The SALRC’s investigation included an extensive analysis of data protection law in 
well-established foreign jurisdictions.
105
 However, it is widely accepted that the POPIA is 
premised on the EU legal regime for data protection.
106
 It was assumed that the POPIA 
would become operational once the office of the Information Regulator was established and 
the POPIA Regulations were issued.
107
 Despite the Information Regulator having being 
established and the gazetting of the draft POPIA Regulations,
108
 at the time of submission of 
this study, the POPIA Act had still not entered into full force and effect,
109
 with some 




2.2.4.2 Objectives and Application of the POPIA 
 
 
Section 2 of the POPIA encapsulates its primary objectives. The limitation contemplated in 
this section will require that a balance be struck between the right to privacy and the right of 
access to information and the interests of free flow of information within and outside SA’s 
borders.
111
 Luck posits that the right to privacy, although fundamental, may be limited and 
balanced, taking into account that data privacy is not confined to domestic policy but is part 
of the global community and therefore economic and trade considerations come into play.
112 
 
As discussed in sub-section 2.2.4.1 above, the POPIA was developed around the 
European data protection regulatory regime; therefore, another important objective is to 






105 The comparative legal jurisdictions investigated included the United Kingdom, Ireland, Canada, Australia, 
the United States of America, the Netherlands, New Zealand and Chile.
  
106 The SALRC Final Report (note 19 above) dealt extensively with the OECD Guidelines Governing the 
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, the Convention for the Protection of Individuals 
with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, and Directive No. 95/46/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal 
Data and on Free Movement.
 
107 A Roos ‘Data Protection Law in South Africa’ (note 56 above) 202-203.  
108 See the discussion on the Information Regulator and the POPIA Regulations in Chapter 1, paragraph 1.1 
above.
  
109 See discussion in Chapter 1, paragraph 1.1 for an update on the status of the promulgation of the remaining provisions of 
the POPIA.  
110 D Milo and G Palmer ‘South Africa- New comprehensive data privacy law passed’ Linklaters 31  
January 2014, available at http://www.linklaters.com/Insights/Publication1403Newsletter/TMT-News-31-
January-2014/Pages/SouthAfrica-New-comprehensive-data-privacy-lawpassed.aspx, accessed on 20 June 2019. 
111 Section 2 (a) (i) and (ii) of the POPIA.  








 Furtherance of this objective is linked to the Information Regulator’s mandate 




The POPIA applies to the processing of personal information where the information is 
entered in a record
115
 by or for a responsible party
116
 by making use of automated or non-
automated means.
117
 The Act also applies where the responsible party resides in SA, 
suggesting it does not have extraterritorial scope of application.
118
 The POPIA applies to a 
responsible party not domiciled in SA, but who utilises automated or non-automated means in 
SA, unless those means are used to only forward personal information through SA.
119 
 
2.2.4.3 Key Terms used in the POPIA 
 
 





 and “responsible party”
122
. Without going into detail, for the purposes of this 
study, the terms “personal information” and “processing” are important for determining the 
protection afforded to data privacy. “Personal information” is broadly defined
123
 and as such 
biometric data, internet protocol addresses and cookie identifiers fall within its definition.
124 
 
The term “processing” is also given a broad meaning to cover any action performed 






113 Section 2(b) of the POPIA.  
114 This function of the Information Regulator is discussed further in Chapter 3.  
115 Section 1 of the POPIA defines a ‘record’ in broad terms.  
116 Section 1 of the POPIA defines a ‘responsible party’ as “a public or private body or any other person which, alone or in 
conjunction with others, determines the purpose of and means for processing personal information.”
 
117 Section 3(1) of the POPIA. The term ‘non-automated means’ is not defined in the POPIA.  
118 Unlike the territorial scope of the POPIA, the GDPR applies to organisations based outside the EU, that 
target EU citizens. See discussion in Chapter 5, paragraph 5.2.2.2 below.
  
119 Section 3(1) (b) (ii) of the POPIA. See Y Burns and A Burger-Smidt A Commentary on the Protection of 
Personal Information Act (note 68 above) at 6. The authors are of the view that in this regard, “the responsible 
party will not be considered to have processed the personal information: he, she or it is acting as a mere conduit 
for the forwarding of personal information, this occurs where the responsible party forwards personal 
information from one country to another and the information is routed by way of automated or non-automated 
means through the Republic.”
  
120 See note 21 above for the definition of ‘processing’.  
121 See note 43 above for the definition of a ‘data subject’.  
122 Section 1 of the POPIA defines a ‘responsible party’ as “a public or private body or any other person  
which, alone or in conjunction with others, determines the purpose of and means for processing 
personal information.” 
123 Section 1 of the POPIA.  







on the responsible party lawfully processing the data subject’s personal information in 
compliance with the eight conditions
125
 discussed below. 
 
2.2.4.4 Conditions for the Lawful Processing of Personal Information 
 
 
The POPIA contains the following eight conditions
126




(a) Condition 1:  Accountability 
 
 
The responsible party must ensure that all the conditions set out in Chapter 3 of the Act are 
complied with at the point when the purpose, collecting the personal information and during 
the processing itself is determined. Accountability is a thread running through the POPIA and 
the responsible party must remain accountable at every stage of the processing.
127 
 
(b) Condition 2: Processing Limitation 
 
 
Condition 2 sets limits regarding the reasons for processing, which include the lawfulness of 




(i) Lawfulness of processing128 
 
 
Processing must be done lawfully and reasonably without infringing privacy rights. This 
requirement is not confined to the POPIA but extends to ensuring compliance with other laws 








125 Y Burns and A Burger-Smidt A Commentary on the Protection of Personal Information Act (note 68 above)  
29.  
126 Chapter 3 of the POPIA.  
127 Y Burns and A Burger-Smidt A Commentary on the Protection of Personal Information Act (note 68 above)  
45.  
128 Section 9 of the POPIA.  











To qualify for processing, personal information must be adequate, relevant and not excessive, 
given the purpose of its intended use. It has been argued that the literal interpretation of 
section 10 requires that all three requirements (adequate, relevant and not excessive) should 
be met for the processing to be regarded as lawful.
131
 For the avoidance of doubt and 
interpretational issues, the minimality requirement should be confined to the specific purpose 
which must be necessary to collect the personal information. 
 
 
(iii) Consent, justification and objection 
 
 
The POPIA defines “consent” as “any voluntary specific and informed expression of will in 
terms of which permission is given for the processing of personal information”.
132
 It has 
been argued that technology creates a barrier to free and informed consent. For example, Big 
Data enables data to be reused outside the purpose limitation for which consent was obtained 
and as such threatens the function and significance of consent as a legal ground.
133
 A holistic 
approach must be adopted to privacy standards in order to enhance the consent requirement 
by embedding privacy by default or privacy by design standards,
134
 which is not a 
requirement in the POPIA. 
 
 
(iv) Collection directly from the data subject135 
 
 
The final requirement of the processing limitation is that the personal information must be 
collected directly from the data subject in order to ensure that the data subject is in control of 
the processing. The POPIA thus provides better protection than common law to ensure active 







130 Section 10 of the POPIA.  
131 Y Burns and A Burger-Smidt A Commentary on the Protection of Personal Information Act (note 68 above)  
51.  
132 Section 1 of the POPIA.  
133 L Mitrou ‘The General Data Protection Regulation: A Law for the Digital Age?’ in Tatiana-Eleni Synodinou et al (ed) 
EU Internet Law: Springer (2017) 39-40.
 
134 Ibid at 42.  
135 Section 12(1) of the POPIA.  






(c) Condition 3: Purpose specification 
 
 
Collection of the personal information must be explicitly defined and relate to a lawful 
purpose linked to an activity or function of a responsible party.
137
 This requirement covers 
the full lifecycle of processing the personal information in relation to the specific purpose for 
which it is collected. The responsible party will be required to inform that data subject of the 




However, given the requirements of section 14(3) of the POPIA, personal information 
could be retained for several years.
138
 The responsible party is required to destroy, delete or 
de-identify a record it as soon as is reasonably practicable once the retention thereof is no 
longer authorised in terms of section 14 (1) and (2).
139 
 
(d) Condition 4: Further processing limitation 
 
 
Further processing of personal information must be in accordance or compatible with the 
original purpose for which it was collected in terms of section 13.
140
 Compatibility is 
determined by taking into account certain factors listed in section 15(2) of the POPIA.
141
 
Further processing is not regarded as incompatible with the initial intended purpose of 
collection if any one of the factors contained in section 15(3)(a) to (f) are met. 
 
 
(e) Condition 5:  Information Quality 
 
 
In terms of section 16 of the POPIA, a responsible party is required to ensure that the 








137 Section 13(1) of the POPIA.  
138 The POPIA allows the responsible party, in the absence of a law or a code of conduct, to retain the record for a period 
which will afford the data subject a reasonable opportunity to request access to the record. Subject to the establishment of 
appropriate safeguards against the records being used for any other purposes, records of personal information may be 
retained for longer periods for historical, statistical or research purposes.
 
139 Section 14(4) of the POPIA.  
140 Section 15(1) of the POPIA.  








 In this regard, the purpose for which personal information is collected or 
further processed must be taken into account by the responsible party.
143 
 
(f) Condition 6: Openness 
 
 
A responsible party has an obligation to maintain documentation relating to all processing 
operations under its responsibility as referred to in sections 14 or 51 of the PAIA.
144
 Section 
18(1), which is similar to section 13(1), requires the responsible party to take reasonably 




(g) Condition 7: Security Safeguards 
 
 
In terms of this condition, in order to secure the integrity and confidentiality of personal 
information, the responsible party must take appropriate, reasonable technical and 
organisational measures to prevent loss, damage or destruction thereof and against unlawful 
access to or processing of personal information.
146
 Technical and organisational measures 
require risk identification prior to safeguards being implemented.
147
 The draft POPIA 
Regulations therefore demonstrate that the Information Regulator is leaning towards a risk-
based approach to POPIA compliance. 
148 
 
This condition contemplates self-regulation and may not be sufficient to counter the 
effects of modern digital technologies which have the potential to bypass security 
mechanisms put in place by the responsible party. It is a novelty and is also not recognised in 
terms of traditional common law principles. However, the POPIA does not include the 





142 Section 16(1) of the POPIA.  
143 Section 16(2) of the POPIA.  
144 Section 17 of the POPIA.  
145 The list of the details is enumerated in section 18(1) (a) to (h) of the POPIA. See further J Neethling  
‘Features of the Protection of Personal Information Bill’ (2013) 75 Journal of Contemporary Roman-Dutch Law 
241-255.  
14, where he points out that this condition forms the basis for effective control by data subjects of the processing of 
their personal information and further indicates that the principle of openness is not known at common law. 
146 Section 19(1)(a) and (b) of the POPIA.  
147 Section 19(2) of the POPIA.  







technology from the design stage; ideally, such provision should be made under the 
accountability condition of the POPIA.
149 
 
(h) Condition 8: Data subject participation 
 
 
This condition flows from the openness principle and grants the data subject two specific 
rights to actively control their personal information, namely, the right of access to their 
personal information and the right to correct or delete it. The common law does not provide 
the data subject with such right. 
 
 
2.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 
It has been argued that the principles of the law of delict provide limited protection of data 
privacy since active control by the data subject of the processing of personal data is not 
recognised. Specific protection of data privacy has not been recognised by the courts applying 
traditional delictual principles in cases involving privacy infringement.
150
 The examination 
of the constitutional provision relating to the right to privacy demonstrates that data privacy is 
not explicitly provided for in section 14; however, case law shows that the Constitutional 
Court has extended protection of privacy to informational (data) privacy. Neethling’s 




The active control principles contained in the POPIA are unique to a data protection 
regulatory regime. It was demonstrated that the POPIA goes beyond common law protection 
of privacy by safeguarding the data subject’s rights which are inherent in the conditions for 
lawful processing.
152
 The authors of a recent article that examines the case Black Sash Trust 
v Minister of Social Development
153
 explain the misuse and unlawful processing of social 
security personal information and call for the POPIA to come into full force and effect to 




149 Condition 1, which is discussed in paragraph 2.2.4.4 (a) above.  
150 A Roos 'Data Protection: Explaining the International Backdrop and Evaluating the Current South African Position’ 
(note 2 above) 422.
 
151 J Neethling et al Neethling’s Law of Personality (note 59 above) 17.  
152 J Neethling ‘Features of the Protection of Personal Information Bill’ (note 145 above) 14.  
153 Black Sash Trust v Minister of Social Development and Others (Freedom Under Law NPC Intervening) 







powers to protect against privacy infringement.
154
 The following Chapter explores the 

































































154 B Batchelor and T Wazvaremhaka ‘Balancing financial inclusion and data protection in South Africa: Black  







CHAPTER 3: AN EVALUATION OF THE POPIA ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS 






The SALRC’s analysis of a data protection regime identified three elements that are required 
for adequate enforcement of a data protection system.
155
 This Chapter explores the POPIA’s 
enforcement and penalty regime and critically evaluates whether this Act contains adequate 
and effective enforcement actions to address interference with data protection. It also 
examines whether the POPIA’s penalty regime is appropriate to enforce data privacy 




3.2 OVERSIGHT AND ENFORCEMENT STRUCTURE 
 
 
The POPIA is premised on the core elements for the external supervision of data protection 
legislation recommended by the SALRC.
156
 It features a regulatory or co-regulatory 
system
157
 rather than a self-regulatory system
158
 to enforce the data protection principles.
159
 





155 These elements include an adequate level of compliance with the data protection conditions; a system which 
provides support and assistance to data subjects to exercise their rights; and the provision of adequate remedies to the 
aggrieved party where such rules have been violated. See SALRC Final Report (note 19 above) 406.
  
156 Refer to SALRC Final Report (note 19 above) at 6.8.1 where the following core elements were 
recommended:
  
“(a) an independent oversight body is tasked with powers to investigate and to participate in legal actions 
where data protection legislation is violated;  
(b) data subjects are able to enforce compliance to data protection legislation independently to an 
information regulator by approaching a court or appealing any decision taken by the person processing the 
personal data or the information regulator;  
(c) an aggrieved party suffering damages due to breach of data protection legislation is entitled to recourse 
by initiating a claim for compensation from the offending party; and  
(d) there are several criminal offences for non-compliance thereto.”  
157 The regulatory or co-regulatory system makes provision for external supervision by an independent authority having 
oversight in respect of enforcement. Refer to the SALRC Final Report (note 19 above) at 8.1.5.
  
158 Ibid. The SALRC explained that in a self-regulatory system, there is no independent authority, such as the 
Information Regulator, to oversee compliance to data protection and consequently the parties processing 
personal data will have the discretion to determine how to comply with such legislation. The data subject will 
then need to approach the courts to enforce his or her rights under such legislation dealing with data protection. 
The ECTA is an example of a self-regulatory system.
  
159 SALRC Final Report (note 19 above) at 6.1.2, where it is specifically indicated that the focus was on the 
enforcement actions of data privacy in the narrow sense which could either be initiated based on a breach of data 
protection legislation through complaints or by oversight authorities through their own investigation and audit 
programme. See further G Greenleaf. (2013a). Chapter 10: ‘Data protection in a globalised network’ in Brown,
  
1 (ed) Research handbook on governance of the Internet. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar 221- 259, where the 






Providers’ Association, the self-regulatory system contained in the ECTA failed.
160
 The 
POPIA seeks to address the deficiencies in the ECTA by protecting data subjects where, for 
instance, spam is sent without the data subject’s consent.
161 
 
Ensuring that technical expertise is part of the Information Regulator’s structure is also 
critical since data protection as a whole and ICT expertise, in particular, have been described 
as “moving targets” due to existing technologies and the rapid rate at which emerging 
technologies are likely to flourish.
162 
 
3.3 ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS 
 
 
The enforcement procedures set out in Chapter 10 of the POPIA are triggered by any 
interference with the data protection rights afforded to a data subject. In terms of section 73 
of the POPIA, such interference is triggered in the following instances: 
 
 
(a) any breach of Chapter 3 comprising of the conditions for lawful processing of 
personal information; 
 
(b) failure to comply with sections 22,163 54,164 69,165 70,166 71167 or 72;168 or 
 
(c) a breach of any aspect of a code of conduct issued in accordance with section 60. 
 
 
The application of the above-mentioned sections is wide enough to cover infringement of 
data protection rights caused by technologies used to process such personal information, 
 
 
DPA to enforce data protection law, carry out investigations of privacy complaints and to ensure that data 
privacy legislation is improved and amended. 
160 Ketler Investment CC Presentations v Internet Service Providers’ Association 2014 (1) ALL SA 566 (GSJ)  
(“Ketler case”).  
161 In the Ketler case, the court determined that section 45 of the ECTA allowed spamming through self-
regulation, which resulted in the defamation of the applicant. Unlike the ECTA, the POPIA will specifically 
hold a wrongdoer liable to ensure that the consent of a data subject is obtained prior to sending unsolicited 
communication or direct marketing and the Information Regulator is vested with the power to ensure it conducts 
research to stay abreast of the moving target nature of technology. The court in the Ketler case accordingly 
acknowledged that the Protection of Personal Information Bill seeks to address spam “in a manner that requires 
some form of relationship to exist between the sender and recipient or some other adequate connection and is 
therefore more restrictive on spam activities than section 45 of ECTA.”
  
162 C Raab and I Szekely ‘Data Protection Authorities and Information Technology’ Computer law & Security Review 
(2017) 33 421–33.
 
163 Section 22 of the POPIA deals with notification of security compromises.  
164 Section 54 of the POPIA deals with the duty of confidentiality.  
165 Section 69 of the POPIA deals with direct marketing by means of unsolicited electronic communications.  
166 Section 70 of the POPIA deals with printed or electronic directories.  
167 Section 71 of the POPIA deals with automated decision making.  







particularly the POPIA conditions relating to consent and technical safeguards, which new 
technologies fall short of meeting. Where a code of conduct is developed to regulate the use 







Section 74 of the POPIA provides that any person is entitled to lodge a complaint with the 
Information Regulator with regard to any alleged interference with data protection rights.
170
 
The complaint has to be lodged in a prescribed manner and form.
171
 It must be lodged in 
writing
172
 and the Information Regulator is required to provide assistance as may be 
reasonably necessary to enable the complainant to do so.
173
 Burns and Burger-Smidt
174
 
submit that the wide locus standi in terms of section 74 allows a third party to act for and on 




On receipt of a complaint, the Information Regulator can proceed with any of the actions set 
out in section 76(1)(a) to (f).
176
    On completion of an investigation, the Information 
Regulator may decide not to proceed with any action only if it is of the opinion that one of the 
grounds referred to under section 77(1)(a) to (f) applies. The Information Regulator is also 
given discretionary powers not to take any further action.
177
 However, in either case, the 
Information  Regulator  is  required  to  inform  the  complainant  of  its  decision  and  the 











169 Sections 60 to 68 of the POPIA set out the requirements for developing codes of conduct.  
170 Section 74(1) of the POPIA.  
171 Regulation 7 (1) of the POPIA Regulations provides that Part I of Form 5 must be used to submit a complaint to the 
Regulator.
 
172 Section 75(1) of the POPIA.  
173 Section 75(2) of the POPIA.  
174 Y Burns and A Burger-Smidt A Commentary on the Protection of Personal Information Act (note 68 above)  
220.  
175 Section 38 of the Constitution deals with enforcement of rights and representation by persons who may 
approach the court for relief if any right contained in the Bill of Rights has been violated.
  
176 These actions include conducting pre-investigations, acting as conciliator in a matter involving infringement of 
data protection rights, fully investigating a complaint, taking no action (after considering the factors in section 77 of 
the POPIA) or referring the compliant to the Enforcement Committee.
 
177 Section 77(2) of the POPIA.  










 by taking the matter on judicial review to a court in 




In conducting investigations in relation to complaints, the Information Regulator has 
broad powers that are equivalent to those of the High Court.
181
 By virtue of such powers, 
aggrieved parties may be more reluctant to approach the Court directly for relief; this would 
thus enhance the Information Regulator’s function of enforcing data protection. 
 
 
3.3.2 Warrants for search and seizure 
 
 
In terms of section 82 of the POPIA, the Information Regulator may apply to the High Court 
or Magistrates Court for a warrant to enter and search premises in its area of jurisdiction only 
upon satisfaction of the reasonable grounds referred to in section 82 (1) of the Act.
182
 The 
Information Regulator has seven days from the date of the warrant to conduct the search, 
inspection, examination, operation and testing of any record, material equipment or device 
which is being used or will be used to process personal information and further to seize the 
offending record, material, equipment or device to be used as evidence.
183
 However, the use 
of certain technologies such as the Cloud to store personal data outside SA will create 




Thus, while the POPIA’s provisions aim to circumvent violation of the constitutionally 
protected right to privacy by providing detailed requirements for the issuing as well as lawful 
execution of a warrant,
184
 where personal information is transmitted and stored outside of SA 










179 Y Burns and A Burger-Smidt A Commentary on the Protection of Personal Information Act (note 68 above)  
223.  
180 No. 3 of 2000. See section 6.  
181 Section 80 of the POPIA.  
182 These grounds include interference with data protection rights or instances where an offence under the POPIA is 
being committed or will likely be committed.
 
183 Section 84 of the POPIA.  









A further enforcement mechanism is the assessment (audit) procedure the Information 
Regulator may conduct to determine if the processing complies with the POPIA.
185
 The 
procedural requirements for conducting assessments are dealt with in terms of Regulation 11 
of the POPIA Regulations.
186
 Upon completion of an assessment, the Information Regulator 
must issue a report on the results and any recommendations arising therefrom.
187
 This report 
has the force of an enforcement notice (discussed in paragraph 3.3.4 below).
188 
 
3.3.4 Enforcement Committee and Enforcement Notices 
 
 
The POPIA allows the Information Regulator to refer a complaint or any other matter (after 
investigation by the Information Regulator) to the Enforcement Committee,
189
 to consider a 
finding with regard to a complaint, any other matter or a recommendation concerning the 
intended action to be taken by the Regulator.
190
 Upon completion of the Enforcement 
Committee’s investigation, the Information Regulator could elect to serve an enforcement 
notice on the responsible party for interfering with the complainant’s personal 
information.
191
 The POPIA allows the responsible party to appeal against an enforcement 





 requires that the Information Regulator appoint an Enforcement 
Committee comprised of a person with specialist knowledge of matters relating to the work of 






185 Section 89 of the POPIA.  
186 In terms of Regulation 11, Part 1 of Form 11 must be used to “request an assessment from the Information 
Regulator, Part II of Form 11 is used by the Information Regulator to inform the requester of its decision to conduct 
the assessment on its own accord or by any person requesting the assessment and Form 12 must be completed by the 
Information Regulator to notify the requester or the responsible party of any decision, action or view taken”.
 
 
187 Section 91(1)(a) and (b) of the POPIA.  
188 Sections 91(3) and 95 of the POPIA.  
189 The Terms of Reference of the Enforcement Committee were signed on 18 April 2019 at 1.2. available 
at https://www.justice.gov.za/inforeg/docs/InfoRegSA-TOR-EFcommittee.pdf, accessed on 12 August 2019. 
190 Section 92(1) of the POPIA.  
191 Section 95(1) of the POPIA. The enforcement notice serves as a directive for the responsible party to either implement 
steps or to refrain from implementing steps or prohibit the unlawful processing in accordance with the manner and time 
period specified in the enforcement notice. See further section 95(1)(a) and (b) of the
  
POPIA. 
192 Section 97 of the POPIA.  










 whether a person with ICT expertise should be appointed. In any event, 
section 47(7) of the POPIA only requires the Information Regulator to appoint a person with 
specialist knowledge on a temporary basis. 
 
 
3.3.5 Civil Remedies 
 
 
Civil proceedings may be instituted by the data subject against a responsible party for 
contravening the provisions of the POPIA.
196
 The Act creates statutory liability, meaning 
that intention or negligence need not be proved by the data subject in a claim for damages 
against the responsible party. The responsible party may rely on the defences specified in 
Section 99(2)(a) to (e) of the POPIA.
197 
 
The Information Regulator may also institute civil action on behalf of the data subject, 
if requested to do so.
198
 Any contravention of the POPIA by the responsible party, will 
entitle the data subject to claim damages suffered as compensation for patrimonial and non-
patrimonial damages.
199
 Aggravated damages, interest and the costs of the suit may also be 
claimed by the data subject.
200 
 
By creating statutory liability for responsible parties, the POPIA provides an adequate 
and effective enforcement mechanism through civil remedies. 
 
 
3.4 PENALTY REGIME 
 
 
3.4.1 Offences and Penalties 
 
 
The POPIA provides for offences for contravention, for which fines or imprisonment can be 





194 Section 47(7) of the POPIA.  
195 See note 189 above.  
196 Section 99 of the POPIA.  
197 The defences available to the responsible party include, vis major; consent and fault on the part of the 
plaintiff; compliance could not be reasonably achieved in the circumstances; or an exemption in terms of section
  
37 was granted by the Information Regulator. 
198 Section 99(1) of the POPIA.  
199 Section 99(3) (a) of the POPIA.  










and “less serious offences”.
202
 Conviction for serious offences renders the 
offender liable to a fine or imprisonment of up to 10 years, or both.
203
 On conviction for a 
less serious offence, a person is liable to a fine or imprisonment for a period of up to 12 
months, or both.
204
 A Magistrates Court has jurisdiction to impose these penalties in terms of 
section 108 of the POPIA. 
 
 
3.4.2 Administrative Penalties 
 
 
In place of criminal proceedings, the POPIA provides an option for a person committing an 
alleged offence to pay an administrative fine. This is subject to the discretion of the 
Information Regulator upon service of an infringement notice on the offending party.
205
 The 
administrative fine must be payable within the time period stipulated in the infringement 
notice and it becomes recoverable if the offender fails to comply with any stipulation in such 
notice.
206
 The Information Regulator can then file a statement with the clerk or registrar of 
any competent court setting out the quantum of the administrative fine payable by the 
offending party.
207
 The statement will have the effect of a civil judgment in favour of the 
Information Regulator for a liquid debt of the amount stipulated in the statement.
208 
 
Serious offences for which a higher penalty can be imposed should include the 
processing of personal information caused by the ill-effects of technologies; for instance, 
where personal information is processed without consent or where it is intentionally or 






201 Serious offences committed by the responsible party include hindering, obstruction or unlawfully influencing the 
Information Regulator, or a person acting on its behalf, in the performance of the Information Regulator’s duties and 
functions under the POPIA; failure to comply with an enforcement notice served in terms of section 95; knowingly giving 
false evidence to the Information Regulator on the basis of a sworn statement or affirmation; unlawful processing of an 
account number of a data subject; knowingly or recklessly, without the data subject’s consent, obtaining or disclosing an 
account number of a data subject to another person; selling an account number, or offering to sell the account number of a 
data subject.
  
202 Less serious offences include failure to notify the Information Regulator of processing without prior 
authorisation; a breach of the duty of confidentiality by persons acting on behalf of the Information Regulator; 
intentionally obstructing the execution of a warrant or, failing without a reasonable excuse to give assistance to 
a person executing a warrant; the responsible party providing a false statement, knowingly or recklessly when 
served with an information notice; and a witness failing to comply with lawful matters set out in section 104(1) 
of the POPIA.
  
203 Section 107(a) of the POPIA.  
204 Section 107(b) of the POPIA.  
205 Section 109(1) of the POPIA.  
206 Section 109(2)(e) of the POPIA.  






3.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 
In principle, the POPIA’s enforcement and penalty regime is in line with the procedural or 
enforcement mechanisms identified by the SALRC, in that, the Act provides a system that 
provides support and assistance to data subjects to exercise their rights as well as adequate 
remedies where such rules have been violated. However, the SALRC’s investigation was 
conducted before the rise of new and emerging technologies and the risks thereof to data 
privacy only surfaced much later. Therefore, the adequacy and effectiveness of the current 
POPIA enforcement and penalty regime has yet to be determined. 
 
 
A recent survey revealed that, in implementing or enforcing the law, DPAs must have 
an understanding of the “information privacy implications of ICT used, large-scale analysis 
of personal data by a variety of interests, and emerging technologies such as emotion-
detection and predictive data analytics.”
209
 Hence, a possible gap in ensuring effective 
enforcement of compliance with the POPIA lies in the fact that the Information Regulator 
may lack technical expertise to meaningfully detect or investigate the impact of existing and 
emerging technologies on data privacy. To strengthen the protection of data subjects, failure 
to effectively implement any of the lawful processing conditions should be regarded as a 
serious offence. Since section 40 (1)(b)(ii) and (e) of the POPIA requires that the Information 
Regulator take a proactive approach to address systemic issues before a breach occurs, the 
following chapter provides a deeper analysis of the envisaged execution of the Information 
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CHAPTER 4: AN ANALYSIS OF THE INFORMATION REGULATOR’S ROLE TO 






In light of the advances brought about by the 4IR, governments face increasing pressure to 
change their approach to public engagement and policymaking. Legislators and regulators 




As discussed in Chapter 1, technological advancement has raised significant concerns 
relating to data subjects’ data privacy.
211
 This calls on DPAs to ensure robust foresight of the 
effect of new and emerging technologies on data protection in order to safeguard and advance 
data privacy rights and ensure effective enforcement of data protection laws. 
 
 
This Chapter assesses the provisions of sections 40(1)(b)(ii)
212
 and 40(e) of the 
POPIA that empower the Information Regulator to execute its functions.
213
 Given that the 
POPIA is a new piece of legislation, the technological foresight
214
 work conducted by well-
established foreign DPAs in the UK and NZ is considered to determine if any lessons can be 
learnt from these jurisdictions. 
 
 
4.2 FUNCTIONS OF THE INFORMATION REGULATOR 
 
 
The fundamental role of DPAs includes eight key functions to advance the protection of 







 Department of Telecommunications and Postal Services Concept Document: Establishment of the 
Presidential Commission on the Fourth Industrial Revolution in GN 764 GG 42078 of 4 December 2018. 
211 See discussion in Chapter 1, paragraph 1.2.  
212 See note 52 above.  
213 See note 53 above.  
214 DB Wills ‘The technology foresight activities of European Union data protection authorities’ (2017) 
116 Technological Forecasting & Social Change 142 explains that activities involving technology foresight are  
“[c]entred around understanding new technology developments, and anticipating their potential effects and 
impacts and in the context of DPA's roles and their collaborative activity (where this activity is sometimes also 
termed ‘technology watch’) this focuses upon the potential impacts of emerging technologies upon data 






negotiator; educator; international ambassador and enforcer.
215
 The POPIA includes all eight 
key functions; however, this discussion focusses on the role of the Information Regulator as 
educator, international ambassador, policy advisor and enforcer. 
 
 
As educator, the Information Regulator must create awareness of the lawful 
processing conditions and objectives.
216
 The Information Regulator’s Outreach and Research 
Committee oversees research, public awareness, education and stakeholder management.
217
 
The Information Regulator confirmed that it has engaged with a number of organisations as 
part of an ongoing stakeholder and training programme in accordance with section 40 of the 
POPIA and that its focus area for its 2018/19 Annual Performance Plan included the 
development, approval and implementation of a Public Awareness Strategy.
218
 This strategy 
should not be broad, but should specifically include, as a standing item, the recent types of 
technological developments which impact on data privacy risks so as to create awareness of 
the application of the lawful processing conditions when using a particular technology. 
However, the POPIA does not include a key provision on privacy by design and default
219
 
and it may thus be difficult to embed awareness of the use of new technologies to counter 
infringements of data privacy from the outset. 
 
 
As policy advisor and enforcer, the Information Regulator must monitor and enforce 
compliance with the POPIA by inter alia, conducting research and monitoring developments 
in information processing and computer technology.
220
 The term ‘computer’ should be 
removed from the technology monitoring function to avoid excluding other technologies and 






 CJ Bennett ‘The Data Protection Authority: Regulator, Ombudsman, Regulator or Campaigner?’ 
Presentation at 24th International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners 9-11 September 
2002, available at web.uvic.ca:8080/polisci/bennett/pdf/Cardiff.pdf , accessed on 11 November 2019. See also 
SALRC Final Report (note 19 above) at 7.2.24. 
216 Section 40(1)(a)(i) of the POPIA.  
217 The Outreach and Research Committee is required to develop a Communications Policy and Strategy, 
Education and Public Awareness Strategy, Training Strategy and Plan, a Research Methodology with a 
prescribed and general focus and an Impact Assessment Strategy and Plan. See Information Regulator Terms of
  
Reference “Outreach and Research Committee” available at http://www.justice.gov.za/inforeg/docs/InfoRegSA-
TOR-ORcommittee.pdf, accessed on 20 September 2019.  
218 Information Regulator presentation on “Briefing of the Portfolio Committee on Justice and Correctional  
Services” dated 24 April 2018 available at https://www.ellipsis.co.za/wp-
content/uploads/2018/05/Information_Regulator_Briefing_24-April_2018.pdf, accessed on 30 September 2019. 
219 This concept, also referred to as ‘data protection by design and default’, is discussed in Chapter 5, paragraph  
5. 2.2.6 below. 








 The Information Regulator is required to take legislative or other action to 
afford better protection to data subjects
222
 and to report to Parliament on the adoption of 
necessary legislative amendments.
223
 This is an important function which should be 
employed by the Information Regulator almost immediately to propose amendments to the 
POPIA to bring it in line with technological developments.
224
 The role of policy advisor also 
extends to the Information Regulator being mandated to issue codes of conduct or guidelines 




As international ambassador, the Information Regulator must co-operate with other 
persons and bodies concerned with data protection on a national and international basis. 
Importantly, the Information Regulator is entitled to research and report to Parliament on SA 
accepting any international instrument relating to the protection of personal information.
226 
 
As part of its 2018/19 Annual Performance Plan, one of the Information Regulator’s focus 
areas was to develop a research strategy to address the “processing of personal information and 
computer technology that promote the protection of personal information and access to 
information.”
227
 No further status update on this strategy has been published by the Information 
Regulator; however, it is interesting that the research strategy focusses on privacy enhancing 
technologies (PETs)
228
 rather than on technological developments which adversely impact data 
privacy protection as required by section 40(1)(e) of the POPIA.
229
 For the Information 





221 For instance, due to the impact of new or emerging digital technologies discussed in Chapter 1, paragraph 1.2 above, the 
current GDPR does not limit technological monitoring to computer technology and the proposed NZ
  
Privacy Bill removes reference to the word ‘computer’ which is currently included in the NZ Privacy Act of 
1993. See discussion under paragraphs 4.3.2.2 and 4.3.3.2 below.  
222 Section 40(1)(b)(iv) of the POPIA.  
223 Section 40(1)(e)(ii) of the POPIA.  
224 Refer to Chapter 5 for a discussion on law reform in other jurisdictions.  
225 Section 40(1)(f)(i) and (ii) of the POPIA.  
226 Section 40(1)(e)(i) of the POPIA.  
227 Information Regulator presentation on “Briefing of the Portfolio Committee on Justice and Correctional  
Services” dated 24 April 2018 available at https://www.ellipsis.co.za/wp-
content/uploads/2018/05/Information_Regulator_Briefing_24-April_2018.pdf accessed on 30 September 2019.  
228 J Van den Hoven et al ‘Privacy and Information Technology’ (note 44 above) at 3.2, explains that privacy-
enhancing technologies are tools which provide users with anonymity. These include, for example, communication-
anonymising tools such as Tor and Freenet, which employ encryption methods as well as identity management 
systems such as ‘single sign on’ functions provided by Google, Facebook and Microsoft which allow users to use a 
single online identity to connect to various online services.
  
229 As suggested, the word ‘computer’ should be removed from the technology monitoring function of the  








include privacy by design and default as a standard obligation for responsible parties, as is 
currently regulated by the GDPR.
230 
 
4.2.1. The Regulation of Technology-Specific or Technologically Neutral Data Protection 
 
 
The regulation of data protection law is technologically neutral if the effect of the technology 
is regulated rather than the technology itself.
231
 It has been argued that the objective of 
regulation of the function or effects of technologies is that the same regulatory principles 
should apply to both the online and offline environments without favour or discrimination.
232
 
However, the scope of application of a technologically-specific legal regime is limited to the 
regulation of specific technologies, which works well when there is a substantial difference 
between the functions or effects of different technologies.
233
 Whilst the ECTA seeks to 
achieve a technologically-neutral approach to regulate electronic commerce transactions, it 




Some authors state that, in the advent of rapid technological development, 
“technologically specific law is sometimes necessary to achieve technologically-neutral” 
regulation and that “any type of legislation is in fact technologically specific, since our 
environment is always technologically mediated.”
235
 However, technologically neutral data 
protection regulation is favoured by the OECD to embrace the changes in the technological 
and social environment.
236
 Another view is that it may not be necessary for DPAs to research 
any new technologies due to the technological neutrality of data protection legislation in the 
 
 
230 Article 25 of the GDPR.  See discussions under Chapter 5, para 5.2.3.6 below.  
231 B Koops ‘The Trouble with European Union Data Protection law’ (2014) 4(4) International Data Privacy 
Law 250-261. See further W Maxwell ‘Technology neutrality in Internet, telecoms and data protection 
regulation’ (2014) Computer and Telecommunications L. Rev, where the author explains that the concept of 
‘technology neutrality” means applying the same regulatory principles regardless of the technology used, and 
that law and regulations should not be drafted in technological silos.
  
232 B Koops ‘The Trouble with European Union Data Protection law’ (note 231 above) 20.  
233 Ibid at 8, where the author accepts that “[t]echnology-specific regulation is acceptable only if there are 
material differences between technologies”.
  
234 Section 2(1)(f) of the ECTA.  
235 M Hildebrandt and L Tielemans ‘Data Protection by Design and Technology Neutral Law’ (2013) 19  
Computer Law & Security Review 509-52 available at 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0267364913001313, accessed on 2 September 2019. 
236 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ‘The Evolving Privacy Landscape: 30 Years  
After the OECD Guidelines’ 06 April 2011 at 4-6 available at https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/the-evolving-
privacy-landscape-30-years-after-the-oecd-privacy 
guidelines_5kgf09z90c31.pdf?itemId=%2Fcontent%2Fpaper%2F5kgf09z90c31-en&mimeType=pdf, accessed 







EU. Nonetheless, it is acknowledged that due to the legal, moral and ethical constraints 
associated with new technologies, DPAs are key drivers to conduct the necessary research to 
understand their impact on data protection.
237 
 
The impact of technological changes on government, businesses and consumers is 
high on the agenda of SA’s Presidential Committee on the Fourth Industrial Revolution, with 
data privacy cited as a key aspect which needs to be addressed.
238
 In my view, a 
technologically neutral approach is the superior approach to regulate data protection as it does 
not prescribe the regulation of specific technologies. Technologically-specific regulation will 
be precarious given that other rapidly evolving or emerging technologies will not be regulated 
in fast-moving markets or that those that are regulated will become obsolete in a few years, 
necessitating an overhaul of the legislation. Instead, to keep pace with rapidly evolving 
technologies, the POPIA should contain a requirement that the Information Regulator conduct 
periodic reviews of the operation of this Act. 
 
 
Furthermore, the Information Regulator should be proactive in developing binding codes of 
conduct or guidelines to address the specific use of technologies, which should also be reviewed 




 of the POPIA. For example, a code of conduct 
should be adopted for manufacturers of technologies
241
 to ensure that privacy controls are 

















 DB Wills ‘The technology foresight activities of European Union data protection authorities’ (note 214 
above) at 6.  
238
 Speech Delivered by Communications Deputy Minister Pinky Kekana at the Microsoft Annual Digital 
Summit in Sun City on 23 May 2019 available at https://www.doc.gov.za/speech-delivered-communications-
deputy-minister-pinky-kekana-microsoft-annual-digital-summit-sun, accessed on 30 September 2019.  
239 Section 64 (1) of the POPIA provides for the amendment or revocation of a code of conduct issued under 
section 60.
  
240 Section 67 of the POPIA provides for the review of an approved code of conduct by the Information 
Regulator.
  
241 M Hildebrandt and L Tielemans ‘Data Protection by Design and Technology Neutral Law’ (2013) (note 
235), the authors argue convincingly that the data protection by design and default provision of the GDPR 
mainly targets data processors using technologies and not the designer or manufacturers of the technologies.
 







4.3 TECHNOLOGY FORESIGHT ACTIVITIES OF DPAs: LESSONS FROM THE 






This section examines the statutory functions of DPAs in the well-established data protection 
regimes of the UK and NZ in order to draw lessons on how the Information Regulator should 
monitor technological developments to address data privacy concerns in line with 
international best practices. DPAs have been fully functional in these jurisdictions since the 
1990s and practical insights into their technological foresight can be drawn that will add 
value to the work of the Information Regulator. 
 
 
The discussion in this Chapter is limited to the statutory functions and activities 
undertaken by DPAs in the UK and NZ to monitor technological developments and to 
counteract adverse effects on data protection. The reforms adopted by these countries to 
enhance data privacy protection in the digital era are discussed in the following Chapter. 
 
 
4.3.2 New Zealand 
 
 
4.3.2.1 The Privacy Commissioner’s Statutory Functions 
 
 
The Privacy Act of 1993 (“the Privacy Act”) governs data protection in NZ and establishes 
the NZ DPA as the Office of the Privacy Commissioner
243
 (“the Commissioner”), which is 
an Independent Crown Entity.
244
 The Commissioner functions independently from 
government or ministerial control. Section 13 of the Privacy Act sets out the functions of the 
Commissioner. For the purpose of this discussion, the functions contained in sections 
13(1)(m) and (n) of the Act
245






 The current Privacy Commissioner is Mr John Edwards. See the Office of the Privacy Commissioner’s 
website available at https://www.privacy.org.nz/the-privacy-act-and-codes/privacy-act-and-codes-introduction/, 
accessed on 01 October 2019. 
244 Part 3, section 12 of the Privacy Act.  
245 Section 13(1)(m) of the Privacy Act provides that the Commissioner is empowered to “inquire about any 
enactment or law, practice, procedure, whether governmental or non-governmental, or any technical 
development if it appears that the privacy of an individual is being or may be infringed” and section 31(1)(n) of 
the Privacy Act mandates the Commissioner to “undertake research and monitor developments in data 
processing and computer technology by ensuring that adverse effects of such developments on the privacy are 








The Commissioner’s functions are similar to those of the Information Regulator in terms 
of the POPIA. The Commissioner is mandated to take proactive steps to research, monitor, 
advise, examine and report on any aspect which negatively impacts data privacy rights. In 
2017, the Commissioner released a public statement on the privacy infringements caused by 
bulk disclosure of household level data recorded by smart meters which give rise to 
involuntary collection and device-based surveillance and is consequently regulated by the 
Privacy Act.
246
 The Commissioner instructed electricity distributors using bulk smart meters 
to take certain steps to avoid the risks to data privacy order and infringement of data privacy 
rights.
247
 The POPIA also allows the Information Regulator to make public statements on 
any matter affecting data protection.
248 
 
The Commissioner is empowered to issue codes of practice
249
 aimed at modifying the 
privacy principles, which have the force of regulation and may be issued by the 
Commissioner itself or on application by a body representing any agency, profession, 
industry or calling.
250
 For example, the Telecommunications Information Privacy Code
251
 
sets out rules on the deployment of caller line identification technology by a network 
operator. Other than this, the Commissioner has not issued a specific code of practice to 




The Privacy Act is undergoing amendment by means of the Privacy Bill which was 
introduced by the Minister of Justice on 20 March 2018. The Commissioner submitted 
extensive comments on the Law Commission’s Review of the Privacy Act 1993: Stage 4.
252
 
With regard to the monitoring of technologies, the new Privacy Bill incorporates the 








 Privacy Commissioner’s ‘Public Statement about bulk disclosure of smart meter data’, available at 
https://www.privacy.org.nz/assets/Uploads/Open-letter-to-retailers-and-distributors-re-smart-meters-
A504260.pdf, accessed on 25 November 2019. 
247 Ibid.  
248 Section 40(1)(a)(iii) of the POPIA.  
249 Section 46 of the Privacy Act. The Commissioner has since issued Codes of Practice which apply to 
the credit reporting, health and telecommunications sectors. 
250 Section 47 of the Privacy Act.  
251 Telecommunications Information Privacy Code 2003 available at https://www.privacy.org.nz/the-
privacy-act-and-codes/codes-of-practice/telecommunications-information-privacy-code/, accessed on 09 
October 2019. 







removed “since computers have become sufficiently ubiquitous as to need no reference and 
such reference” may have “the adverse effect of appearing to exclude other technologies.”
253 
 
4.3.2.2 Monitoring Technological Developments 
 
 
As part of its function to research and monitor technological developments, the 
Commissioner’s current Technology Strategy
254
 sets out the overarching strategic objectives 
of the Commissioner, which focus on priority outcomes to manage advancements in digital 




The Commissioner has a dedicated team to monitor technological developments and 
media reports. In researching and monitoring technological developments, the Commissioner 
undertakes activities such as releasing media statements on the use of technologies;
256
 and 
participating in the work of the International Working Group on Data Protection and 
Telecommunications and the OECD Working Party on Information Security and Privacy. The 
Commissioner also conducts public opinion surveys on privacy and technological 
developments, and publishes ‘getting started’ guidelines, guidance notes,
257







253 Submission by the Office of the Privacy Commissioner on the Law Commission’s Review of the Privacy Act  
1993: Stage 4 dated 14 June 2010 at 82 available https://privacy.org.nz/the-privacy-act-and-codes/privacy-law-
reform/new-zealand-law-commission-privacy-review/, accessed on 01 October 2019. See Chapter 5 for a 
discussion on the data protection law reform.  
The Commissioner premised its strategy on technology work, focussing on the outcome of ‘improved private 
sector privacy practices’. The outcomes include creating good privacy practices by working with innovators to 
use privacy enhancing technology. See the Office of the Privacy Commissioner’s Technology Strategy entitled 
‘Making the Future: Working with business to create a smarter, brighter future for privacy’ dated December  
2014 available at https://www.privacy.org.nz/assets/Files/Policies-and-values-transparency/Making-the-Future-
Working-with-business-to-create-a-smarter-brighter-future-for-privacy.pdf, accessed on 02 October 2019. 
 
255 In the latest Statement of Intent, the Privacy Commissioner will focus on digital technologies by increasing 
citizen/consumer trust in the digital economy, promote and support innovation and improve personal data practices by 
increasing influence. See Office of the Privacy Commissioner’s Statement of Intention 2017-2021 available at 
https://www.privacy.org.nz/assets/Uploads/OPC-Statement-of-Intent-2017-2022.pdf, accessed on 02 October 2019. 
 
256 For example, see media release: Meeting Technology Challenges Head On: Modern Tools for Modern 
Problems dated 2 August 2011 available at https://www.privacy.org.nz/news-and-publications/statements-
media-releases/media-release-meeting-technology-challenges-head-on-modern-tools-for-modern-problems/, 
accessed on 02 October 2019.  
257 Guidance Notes published on technological issues include cloud computing, CCTV and apps guidance. See 
Privacy Commissioner website link to guidance notes available at https://privacy.org.nz/news-and-publications/guidance-








 and other educational resources on technological issues.
259
 The Law 
Commission commended the Commissioner for raising awareness of new technologies, but 
highlighted that the Commissioner must provide guidance on new technologies at an earlier 
stage in order to assess the impact of these technologies on data privacy. The Law 
Commission thus proposed that the Commissioner should issue bulletins and updates on new 
technologies which should include developments or experiences from other countries.
260 
 
The Law Commission proposed that the Privacy Act provide for a Privacy Advisory 
Panel or that expert panels be set up by the Commissioner to address technological 
advances.
261
 The Commissioner did not favour this proposal and submitted that a statutory 
committee should not be legislated but rather, the Commissioner should have the discretion to 
set up a panel of experts in line with its independence so that it can promptly respond to the 











All countries in Europe are required to align their data protection laws to the EU GDPR
263
 
which took effect on 25 May 2018. The GDPR regulates the processing of personal data 
across every sector of the EU economy. The UK’s Data Protection Act of 2018 (“DP Act”) 
came into force on 23 May 2018, repealing the UK Data Protection Act 1998 in its entirety. 
The DP Act is designed to align to and supplement the GDPR data protection 
requirements.
264







 Blogs include information on big data. See Privacy Commissioner’s website available at 
https://privacy.org.nz/search/SearchForm?Search=big+data&Sections%5B1313%5D=1313&searchlocale=en 
_NZ&action_results=Go, accessed on 03 October 2019.  
259 See New Zealand Department of Internal Affairs website available at https://www.digital.govt.nz/standards-
and-guidance/privacy-security-and-risk/privacy/, accessed on 02 October 2019 . 
260 Law Commission’s Review of the Privacy Act 1993: Stage 4 (Report 123) (note 252) at paragraph 10.18.  
261 Ibid at paragraph 10.43.  
262 Submission by the Office of the Privacy Commissioner on the Law Commission’s Review of the Privacy Act 1993: 
Stage 4 (note 253 above).
  
263 EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR): Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of 
personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data 
Protection Regulation), OJ 2016 L 119/1.
  







GDPR has been described as better suited to the internet age as it creates rules for data 




The use of cookies and similar technologies
267
 is specifically regulated by the Privacy 
and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations (PECR) of 2003, which regulate 
the storage of information and access thereto on mobile or computer devices The European 
Directive 2002/58/EC (“the privacy Directive”)
268
 is implemented by the PECR. Specific 
protection from online privacy is necessary to enhance a data subject’s rights and the POPIA 
is deficient in this regard. 
 
 
4.3.3.2. The Information Commissioner’s Office Statutory Functions 
 
 
The Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO)
269
 is the UK’s independent data supervisory 
authority which was established to uphold individual data privacy rights.
270
 The ICO 
enforces both the DP Act and the PECR and is endowed with enforcement powers in terms of 










265 See media publication of the Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport and Home Office available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/data-protection-act-2018, accessed on 02 October 2019. 
266 A  Giurgiu  and  TA  Larsen  ‘Roles  and  Powers  of  National  Data  Protection  Authorities:  Moving  from  
Directive 95/46/EC to the GDPR: Stronger and More “European” DPAs as Guardians of Consistency?’ (2016)  
2 The European Data Protection Law Review 347. See further A Giurgiu and G Lommel, ‘A new Approach to 
EU Data Protection – More Control over Personal Data and Increased Responsibility’ (2014) 1 Critical 
Quarterly for Legislation and Law 10-27, where the authors explain that the GDPR “[l]ays down solely the 
essential principles, thus avoiding becoming too detailed or too prescriptive. It puts a strong emphasis on 
placing the controller in a position where he needs to take responsibility for his actions. It also equips the data 
subjects with the proper tools to take control over their data and enforce their rights on- and off-line.”  
267 Similar technologies include fingerprinting techniques, scripts, tracking pixels and plugins. The forms 
of similar technological uses are described in detail in the ICO’s “Guidance on the use of cookies and similar 
technologies” dated 03 July 2019, pages 6-7, available at https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-
pecr/guidance-on-the-use-of-cookies-and-similar-technologies/, accessed on 03 October 2019.  
268 The Privacy Directive is more specific in terms of privacy rights in relation to electronic 
communications. According to the ICO, “it recognizes that widespread public access to digital mobile networks 
and the internet opens up new possibilities for businesses and users, but also new risks to their privacy.” See 
ICO website for an overview of the PECR available at https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-pecr/what-
are-pecr/, accessed on 02 October 2019. See also the ICO’s “Guide to Privacy and Electronic Communications 
Regulations” available at https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-pecr/, accessed on 02 October 2019. See 
further discussion in Chapter 5, paragraph 5.2.1 below.  
269 Elizabeth Denham is the current Information Commissioner of the ICO.  






Part 5 of the DP Act read with Schedules 12 and 13
271
 sets out the ICO’s powers, functions 
and duties. General functions are conferred on the ICO by Articles 57 (tasks) and 58 (powers) 
of the GDPR. Schedule 13 of the DP Act also includes certain general tasks conferred on the 
ICO in terms of Article 57 of the GDPR. The relevant general tasks of the ICO set out in 
Schedule 13
272
 to ensure that the processing of personal information is not negatively 
impacted by technological developments include monitoring relevant technological 
developments,
273
 promoting public awareness of the risks associated with processing 
personal data
274
 and advising Parliament, government or institutions on relevant legislative 




4.3.2.3 Monitoring Technological Activities 
 
 
Like the NZ Commissioner, the ICO published a Technology Strategy
276
 aligned to its 
Information Rights Strategic Plan 2017-2021 to “[s]tay relevant, provide excellent public 
service and keep abreast of evolving technology” and to “outline the means of adapting to 




 The ICO acknowledges that technological advances and data privacy and 
 
innovation are not mutually exclusive, but operate hand-in-hand to create trust and 
confidence and must be viewed as a risk and an opportunity.
278
 The Technology Strategy sets 
out eight technology goals and the manner in which these will be achieved.
279
 In addition, 
the ICO’s Innovation Plan
280
 addresses the manner in which new technologies or disruptive 
business models could adapt to the UK’s legislative and enforcement framework and how 




271 In terms of section 116(2) of the DP Act, “Schedule 13 confers general functions on the Commissioner in connection 
with processing to which the GDPR does not apply.”
  
272 Schedule 13 of the DP Act contains a repetition of some of the tasks assigned to the supervisory authorities in 
terms of Article 57 of the GDPR because the legislature intended that key functions should remain vested in the ICO 
even after the UK exits the EU.
  
273 Schedule 13(1)(h) of the DP Act. The GDPR contains similar wording to this provision; however, it expands application 
to “commercial practices”. See Article 57 of the GDPR.
 
274 Schedule 13 (1)(b) of the DP Act.  
275 Schedule 13 (1)(c) of the DP Act.  
276 Information Commissioner’s Office ‘Technology Strategy 2018-2021’ available at 
https://ico.org.uk/media/about-the-ico/documents/2258299/ico-technology-strategy-2018-2021.pdf, accessed on 
2 October 2019. 
277 Ibid at 4.  
278 Ibid at 3.  
279 See Information Commissioner’s Office ‘Technology Strategy 2018-2021’ (note 276 above).  
280 Information Commissioner’s Office “Innovation Plan” dated April 2017 available at 








The ICO’s technology foresight activities are based on a “intelligence hub” that gathers 
information and intelligence from various sources, such as academics, journalists and 
technologists.
281
 Recent planned technological foresight activities or initiatives undertaken 
by the ICO include the following:- 
 
 
(i) participation as an active member in international forums on technology;282 
 
(ii) a Technology Reference Panel was formed, with expert consultants soliciting advice on 




(iii) An ICO Technology Policy Department which focusses on horizon scanning for new 
technological developments; 
 





(v) providing guidance and advice to industry regarding the ‘privacy by design’ 
approach
285









(vii) blogs on technology and innovation and guidance on privacy impact assessments are 








 D Barnard-Wills ‘The technology foresight activities of European Union data protection authorities’ 
Technological Forecasting & Social Change (2016) 4.  
282 The ICO regards engagement with external stakeholders on identifying trends or developments of technology as ‘open 
policy development’. The ICO is a member of the Working Party 29 Technology Subgroup, International Working Group on 
Data Protection in Telecommunications; and the Internet Privacy Engineering Network. See ICO’s Innovation Plan (note 
280 above).
 
283 Ibid.  
284 Guidance documents have been published on artificial intelligence, data protection, cloud computing, 
big data, encryption, machine learning, Wi-Fi location analytics and cookies and similar technologies. See ICO 
website “Guidance Index” available at https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guidance-index/data-protection-act-
1998/, accessed on 02 October 2019.  
285 The ICO recently launched the Sandbox service to support organisations to develop products and services 
that use personal data in an innovative and compliant manner. See ICO website “The Guide to the Sandbox
  
(beta phase)” available at https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/the-guide-to-the-sandbox-beta-phase/, accessed 
on 05 October 2019.  
286 Information Commissioner’s Innovation Plan (note 280 above).  
287 Research is being conducted on artificial intelligence, the Internet of Things and automated decision making, big data 









(viii) setting up an ICO Grants Programme to promote research into innovative solutions 





The ICO was consulted by the court in R v The Chief Constable of South Wales Police and 
others.
290
 Whilst the court ruled that the use of live facial recognition technology was lawful 
when conducted by the police for investigation purposes, it acknowledged that legislative 
steps should be taken to keep pace with such technology. In light of this recommendation, the 
ICO, suggested that “a statutory and binding code of practice…..should seek to address the 
 




Furthermore, in response to developments in surveillance technologies, the ICO 
revised its CCTV code of practice
292
 and more recently tabled the Data Sharing Code to the 
Secretary of State for approval.
293
 A recent write-up highlighted that UK businesses are 




4.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 
Echoing the sentiments expressed by the South African government in the introductory 
paragraph of this Chapter and authors such as Flaherty who are of the view that “[o]ne cannot 
regulate a system without fully understanding it,” DPAs’ expert knowledge plays an 
important role in this regard.
295
 It has been argued that their role of monitoring technological 
 
 
288 See ICO website “Tech and Innovation” available at https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/what-we-do/tech-
and-innovation/, accessed on 05 October 2019.  
289 Ibid.  
290 [2019] EWHC 2341.  
291 ICO’s ‘Opinion on the use of live facial recognition technology by law enforcement in public places’ 31  
October 2019 available at https://ico.org.uk/media/about-the-ico/documents/2616184/live-frt-law-enforcement-
opinion-20191031.pdf, accessed on 25 November 2019.  
292 ICO ‘CCTV Codes of Practice’ available at https://ico.org.uk/media/1542/cctv-code-of-practice.pdf, 
accessed on 25 November 2019.  
293 ICO ‘Data Sharing Code’ available at https://ico.org.uk/media/2615361/data-sharing-code-for-public-
consultation.pdf, accessed on 02 November 2019.  
294 Reed Smith ‘One year of GDPR – lessons learned by the ICO’ 4 June 2019, available at 
https://www.technologylawdispatch.com/2019/06/privacy-data-protection/one-year-of-gdpr-lessons-learned-by-
the-ico/, accessed on 27 November 2019. 
295 D Flaherty ‘Controlling Surveillance: Can Privacy Protection Be Made Effective?’ (2018) in Agre, P. and  
Rotenberg, M. (eds.) Technology and Privacy: The New Landscape. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press: 167-192. 








developments requires ICT expertise as they need to keep abreast of the impact of new 




The technological foresight activities of the UK and NZ’s DPAs demonstrate that the 
Information Regulator should adopt a proactive rather than a reactive stance in undertaking 
technological foresight. Given that the Information Regulator is assuming a new role as a 
data protection regulator, it may not be fully resourced with the technical skills and ICT 
expertise required to fully carry out the technological foresight activities conducted by the 
UK and NZ DPAs. 
 
 
Therefore, as a short to medium term goal, the Information Regulator should adopt 
the ICO’s “intelligence hub” model by gathering information and intelligence from various 
sources, such as academics, journalists and technologists and also amend the POPIA to 
include data protection by design and default requirements to strengthen its technological 
monitoring role. In the long term, the Information Regulator may elect to adopt the 










































CHAPTER 5: DATA PROTECTION LAW REFORM IN THE EUROPEAN 





It is clear that on-going technological developments have increased the risk of privacy 
infringements.
297
 As discussed in Chapter 4, DPAs have a statutory duty to monitor the 
impact of technologies and to propose updates to their respective data protection legal 
regimes to ensure that such laws keep pace with rapid advances in technology. 
 
 
Whilst not all features of foreign data protection legal reform may be relevant to SA, 
the POPIA needs to remain adequate to achieve the objective of protecting the individual’s 
right to privacy in an ever-changing technological era. The features of legal reform in the 
data protection regimes of the EU, the UK and NZ are considered in this Chapter to 
determine the extent to which such legal reform may promote data privacy protection in the 
South African context, in terms of enhancing the protection afforded to data subjects to 
counter the negative impact of new or emerging technologies on data privacy. 
 
 






Globally, the EU has led legal and policy formulation for data protection and the POPIA was 
largely premised on the earlier EU data protection legal instruments and guidelines.
298
 It has 
been noted that, in terms of the Bill of Rights, the courts have an obligation to consider 
international law;
299
 therefore any defining feature of legal developments with specific regard to 
legislative reform influenced by technological changes adopted by foreign jurisdictions should be 








 Refer to Chapter 1, paragraph 1.2 above for a discussion on new and emerging communications and 
information technologies which pose data protection challenges.  
298
 SALRC Final Report (note 19 above) 163-4. The legislature adopted the OECD Guidelines and the EU 
Directive data protection principles. The SALRC stated that these data protection principles are internationally 
accepted best practices and also technologically neutral. 







The EU recognises data protection as a separate right to the right to privacy.
300
 Following a 
proposal by the European Commission (EC) to address inconsistencies in member states’ data 
protection law, the EU Directive
301
 was adopted as an omnibus data protection regime.
302
 
While it required member states to enact data protection legislation, the harmonisation of 
national data protection laws was not fully achieved as member states favoured big tech 
companies by imposing weak enforcement penalties. Coupled with the explosion in internet 
users, this prompted the EC to set the wheels in motion to propose legislative reform to 
modernise and replace the provisions of the EU Directive. 
 
 
The courts interpret EU legislation together with interpretation by the European Data 
Protection Board, whose opinions have persuasive and non-binding force. If national judges 
have difficulty interpreting EU rules, they may, in some cases, refer the matter to the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU).
303
 The CJEU is the highest authority which deals 
with interpretation of EU data protection laws.
304
 For example, it granted data subjects a 
‘right to be forgotten’
305
 and recently ruled that active consent is required for the storage of 
cookies which are used to track online browsing behaviour.
306 
 
May 2018 witnessed a regulatory paradigm shift in the EU data protection regime 
consisting of a legal reform package in the form of the GDPR
307
 and the Law Enforcement 
Directive.
308
 The GDPR repealed the 1995 EU Directive in its entirety.
309
 This Regulation 
 
 
300 Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.  
301 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data.
 
302 CJ Hoofnagle et al ‘The European Union general data protection regulation: what it is and what it means?’  
(2019) 28(1) Information & Communications Technology Law 65-98 available at 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/citedby/10.1080/13600834.2019.1573501?scroll=top&needAccess=true, 
accessed on 29 September 2019.  
303 Article 19(3)(b) of the Treaty on European Union.  
304 Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner [2015] Case C-362/14 ECLI:EU:C: 2015:650.  
305 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (May 13, 2014) available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=152065&doclang=EN, accessed on 01 October 
2019.  
306 L. Mitrou “Data Protection, Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Services: Is The General Data Protection  
Regulation (GDPR) ‘Artificial Intelligence-Proof?’” December 2013 available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3386914, accessed on 31 July 2019.  
307 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of 
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing 
Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32016R0679&from=EN, accessed on 30 July 2019. The GDPR entered into force on 24 
May 2016 and was effective as of 25 May 2018.  
308 Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of 
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the 








aims to enhance the protection of data privacy in the digital age and to set rules for data 
processors in the digital single market. Overall, the GDPR harmonises data protection law 
across the EU to maintain consistency in the legal systems of member states and to prevent 
unnecessary administrative burdens.
310
 Importantly, it takes particular cognisance of rapid 
technological developments which rendered the 1995 EU Directive inadequate in providing a 
high degree of protection of data privacy.
311
 The ePrivacy Directive which regulates online 




Since data privacy is a moving target that is impacted by technological developments, it 
is necessary to ensure that a data protection legal regime is fine tuned to address deficiencies 
through legislative reform. However, it is yet to be seen if the enhanced protection afforded 
by the GDPR can withstand the new or emerging technologies used to process personal data. 
 
5.2.2 Changes to the EU Data Protection Regime 
 
 
The GDPR is technologically neutral in that it affords protection to a data subject
313
 
irrespective of the form or type of technology used to process personal data.
314
 It has been 
described as “technology-independent legislation” which does not refer to “technology-
specific terminology but the provisions thereof exhibit a ‘technological neutrality 
approach’.”
315
 The discussion below does not present a detailed analysis of all changes to the 





and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA available at 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal  
content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2016.119.01.0089.01.ENG&toc=OJ%3AL%3A2016%3A119%3ATOC 
,accessed on 30 July 2019. The Enforcement Directive was passed on 5 May 2016 and came into effect on 6 
May 2018.  
309 See Article 94(1) of the GDPR. The EU Directive required EU member states to transpose its provisions into their 
national laws; however, the GDPR, as a regulation, takes direct effect on EU member states, meaning that, they do not have 
to transpose the provisions of the GDPR into their national laws. However, the GDPR allows member states to derogate 
from certain provisions in their national laws. Article 23 allows member states to derogate from certain provisions of the 
GDPR relating to rights in Articles 12 to 22 and from the data protection principles in Article 5 provided that they 
correspond to the rights in Articles 12 to 22.
 
310 Recital 9 of the preamble of the GDPR.  
311 Recital 6 of the preamble of the GDPR.  
312 See discussion under paragraph 5.2.2.7 below.  
313 The GDPR does not contain a separate definition of a ‘data subject’ but encompasses the description of a 
data subject in the definition of ‘personal data’. See Article 4(1) of the GDPR.
  
Unlike the POPIA, the GDPR does not recognise a juristic person as a data a subject. 







encompassing enhanced rights to data subjects and obligations imposed on data controllers
316
 
to prevent data privacy infringement occasioned by the use of technology. These provisions 
are not specifically addressed by the POPIA. The novelty provisions discussed below 












 including public and non-sensitive information.
319
 The wide application of the 
GDPR in a ‘smart environment’ has created the perception that the GDPR requirements will, in 
future, apply to all forms of data, becoming ‘the law of everything’.
320
 The definition of 
‘personal data’ extends to the ‘online identifier’ and ‘location data’,
321
 which is aligned to the 
online reality. For example, the GDPR obligations will apply where a device is linked to an IP 




With reference to Recital 26 of the GDPR, Mitrou states that, although vague, 
identifiability is a dynamic criterion which takes into account the technology used at the time 
of processing as well as technological advances.
323
 Hence, notwithstanding the technology 





316 A ‘controller’ is defined in the GDPR as “[t]he natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body which, 
alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data; where the purposes and 
means of such processing are determined by Union or Member State law, the controller or the specific criteria for its 
nomination may be provided for by Union or Member State law.” See Article 4(7) of the GDPR.
 
317 This includes obvious data applicable to a natural person such his or her name, identity number, addresses or 
contact details. See the EU GDPR website available at https://gdpr.eu/eu-gdpr-personal-data/, accessed on 07 December 
2019. 
 
318 It includes less obvious data such as online identifiers, location data, or factors relating to the physiological, 
physical, mental, genetic, social, cultural or economic identity of a natural person. See the EU GDPR website 
available at https://gdpr.eu/eu-gdpr-personal-data/, accessed on 07 December 2019. 
319 CJ Hoofnagle et al ‘The European Union general data protection regulation: what it is and what it means?’  
Information & Communications Technology Law (note 302 above). 
320 N Purtov ‘The law of everything. Broad concept of personal data and future of EU data protection law’  
(2018) Law, Innovation and Technology 40 available at 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17579961.2018.1452176, accessed on 30 September 2019.  
321 Recital 30 of the GDPR. See further L Mitrou ‘The General Data Protection Regulation: A Law for the 
Digital Age?’ (note 133 above) 24.
  
322 Ibid 24. Also see Case C-582/14 Breyer v Bundesrepublik Deutschland ECLI:EU:C:2016:779 at 35, where 
the European Court of Justice broadly interpreted the 1995 EU Directive to include an IP address stored by an 
internet service provider as personal data, which “registers IP addresses of the users of a website that it makes 









 For example, data such as the name, email address, biometric data, 




Furthermore, the term ‘processing’ is expanded in the GDPR.
325
 Technologies such as 
Blockchain and Artificial Intelligence or machine learning which are automated means that 
perform operations relating to personal data, continued storage thereof and/or further 
processing, fall squarely within Article 4(2) of the GDPR. 
 
 
5.2.2.2 Extraterritorial Application 
 
 
The GDPR has extraterritorial application,
326
 which means that it can apply even if a 
business has no physical presence in the EU.
327
 The European Court of Justice (ECJ) set out 
the factors to be considered when determining the territorial scope of EU data protection 
law.
328
 The GDPR will apply exterritorialy if two conditions are met, namely, where 
processing activities relate to the “offering of goods or services, irrespective of whether a 
payment of the data subject is required to such data subjects in the Union”
329
 and “where 
processing activities relates to the monitoring of behaviour as far as this behaviour takes place 
within the Union.”
330
 This means that South African businesses must comply with the GDPR 







323 L. Mitrou “Data Protection, Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Services: Is The General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) ‘Artificial Intelligence-Proof?’” (note 306 above) 30.
  
324 Recital 26 of the GDPR.  
325 Article 4(2) of the GDPR.  
326 Article 3(1) of the GDPR.  
327 See for example, Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos 
(AEPD), Mario Costeja González [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, where the Court held that Google Spain is an 
establishment of Google Inc., and the selling of advertising activities was “carried out in the context of the activities 
of the Spanish establishment, so the search engine had to comply with EU law.”
 
328 C-230/14, Weltimmo S.R.O. V. Nemzeti A Datvedelmi Es Informacioszabadsagh Atosag (Hungarian DPA),  
1.10.15. The ECJ decided that factors such as “the degree of stability of the arrangements and the effective 
exercise of activities … must be interpreted in the light of the specific nature of the economic activities and the 
provision of services concerned.”  
329 Article 3(2)(a) of the GDPR. See the European Parliament’s study on the ‘Blockchain and the General Data 
Protection Regulation: Can distributed ledgers be squared with European data protection law?’ (note 344 above) 
where the example is used of blockchain operators that offer infrastructure as a service to individuals in the EU.
  
330 Article 3(2)(b) of the GDPR. See the European Parliament’s study on the ‘Blockchain and the General Data 
Protection Regulation: Can distributed ledgers be squared with European data protection law?’ (note 344 above) 
where it was illustrated that the GDPR will apply where foreigners use blockchain technology to process personal data 







The fact that the GDPR is described as “international data protection law,”
331
 has raised 
contention as there could be a conflict between the EU data protection legislation and that of 
countries outside the EU.
332
 Ambiguity in this regard has been justified by the fact that non-EU 
business will have to comply with the GDPR if they offer goods or services to EU citizens or if 
they monitor the behaviour of such citizens. It such cases, the GDPR requires businesses to 






5.2.2.3 Lawfulness of Processing in Terms of Consent 
 
 
As a starting point in proposing legislative amendments, the EC emphasised the need for 
more effective control of personal information in the digital era. Consent is arguably the most 
fundamental safeguard afforded to data subjects to exercise their rights to informational self-
determination.
334
 As a new formulation under the GDPR, consent involves a restrictive 
approach in that it must be “freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous.”
335 
 
A request for consent by electronic means must be “clear, concise and not unnecessarily 
disruptive to the use of the service for which it is provided.”
336
 For example, pre-tick boxes, 
silence or inactivity do not constitute consent. The CJEU recently delivered judgment in the 
Planet49
337
 case which dealt with the requirements of consent for the use of cookies and 
similar technologies. The court had to decide whether pre-ticked boxes on an online lottery 





  S Bu-Pasha ‘Cross-border issues under EU data protection law with regards to personal data protection’ 
(2017) 26 (3) Information & Communications Technology Law) 213-228. 
332 Ryngaert, C & Taylor, M ‘Symposium on the GDPR and International Law: The GDPR as Global Data  
Protection Regulation?’ (2020) available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-
core/content/view/CB416FF11457C21B02C0D1DA7BE8E688/S2398772319000801a.pdf/gdpr_as_global_data 
_protection_regulation.pdf, accessed on 02 January 2020, where it is explained that EU data protection law is 
based on territoriality, triggered by a territorial link of an activity or person residing in the EU or those being 
targeted or monitored in the EU. The GDPR’s broad territorial coverage also applies to individuals who are able 
to demonstrate an affiliation to the EU, either by citizenship or residence. The authors indicated that the 
assertions of the EU that the GDPR has extraterritorial application “may be justifiable under the passive 
personality principle, which allows the EU to protect EU citizens or residents….”  
333 Article 27 and Recital 80 of the GDPR. See further Bu-Pasha, S. ‘Cross-border issues under EU data 
protection law with regards to personal data protection’ (note 331) 219.
  
334 L Mitrou ‘The General Data Protection Regulation: A Law for the Digital Age?’ (note 133 above) 34.  
335 See definition of ‘consent’ in Article 4(11) of the GDPR and see further Recital 32 of the Preamble to the  
GDPR. 
336 Recital 32 of the GDPR.  
337 Planet49 GmbH v Bundesverband der Verbraucherzentralen und Verbraucherverbände – 








requirements of specific and unambiguous consent. The CJEU held that such boxes are not 
valid because this does not provide affirmative consent as required by the ePrivacy Directive, 
the 1995 EU Directive and, now the GDPR, and stated as follows: 
 
 
In that regard, it would appear impossible in practice to ascertain objectively whether a website user 
had actually given his or her consent to the processing of his or her personal data by not deselecting 
a pre-ticked checkbox nor, in any event, whether that consent had been informed.338 
 
For consent to be informed, the data subject must be aware of the purpose of the 
processing of the personal data as well as the identity of the controller.
339
 Another unique 
feature of the GDPR is that the onus is on the controller to demonstrate that the data subject 
has consented to the processing of his or her personal information.
340
 The Article 29 Data 
Protection Working Party has issued ‘Guidelines on Consent’ to clarify the scope of its 
application.
341
 It is recommended that mechanisms to comply with the consent requirements 
under the GDPR should include written acknowledgment by the data subject such as clicking 
an 'I-agree-button' together with a privacy policy.
342 
 
5.2.2.4 Right to be Forgotten 
 
 
The right to be forgotten embraces informational self-determination that enables data subjects 
to exercise control over their personal information. The GDPR allows data subjects to obtain 
'erasure' of their personal data from the data controller subject to certain conditions.
343
 The 
right of erasure has been described as “a qualified and a limited right.”
344






338 Ibid at paragraph 55.  
339 Recital 42 of the GDPR.  
340 Article 7(1) of the GDPR.  
341 Article  29  Data  Protection  Working  Party  “Guidelines  on  consent  under  Regulation  2016/679”  
WP259rev.01, 10 April 2018 18 available at https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:l-
b4dUk35iAJ:https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/article29/document.cfm%3Faction%3Ddisplay%26doc_id%3D510 
30+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=za, accessed on 09 November 2019.  
342 T Mulder ‘Health Apps, their Privacy Policies and the GDPR’ (2019) 10 (1) European Journal of Law and 
Technology 7 available at http://ejlt.org/article/view/667/897, accessed on 09 November 2019. 
343 Article 17(1) of the GDPR.  
344 The European Parliament’s study on the ‘Blockchain and the General Data Protection Regulation: Can 
distributed ledgers be squared with European data protection law?’ (note 344 above) 75. See also Case C-398/15 
Salvatore Manni [2017] EU:C: 2017:197 at 46 where court recognised that the right of erasure of data is 
guaranteed in instances where the conditions laid down in the then 1995 EU Directive were not complied with 








case the ECJ held that the right to erasure cannot be invoked for the purposes of correcting 
incorrect examination results as this counters the spirit of Article 17 of the GDPR.
345 
 
The leading case on the right to be forgotten is Google v Spain,
346
 where the CJEU 
held that the 1995 EU Directive authorises a data subject to demand that the search engine 
operator remove personal information containing his or her name from search results and 
links to web pages published by third parties “on the ground that . . . he wishes it to be 
‘forgotten’ after a certain time.”
347
 However, the court indicated that this right is not 
absolute. The court then turned to right to be forgotten in terms of the GDPR and also held 
that this right is not absolute on the basis that Google could refuse the data subject’s request 
if any of the conditions contained in Article 17(3) of the GDPR apply.
348 
 
Recently, in Google v CNIL & Others
349
 the CJEU dealt with the interpretation of the 
territorial scope of the right to be forgotten contained in Article 17 of the GDPR and 
considered whether Google is required to carry out de-referencing on all search engines 
worldwide or merely on those provided in the EU. It was held that the right to be forgotten 
does not have global application. Whilst the Court acknowledged that the internet has no 
borders, it stated that the obligation to de-reference for versions of search engines outside the 
EU does not exist under EU data protection legislation. 
 
 
5.2.2.5 Right to Data Portability 
 
 
An innovative feature of the GDPR is the right to data portability which allows the data 
subject to transfer or port data from one controller to another.
350
 The right to data portability 






345 Case C-434/16 Peter Nowak [2017] EU:C: 2017:994 at 52.  
346 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), Mario 
Costeja González (note 327).
  
347 Ibid at paragraph 89.  
348 These conditions include exercising the right of freedom of expression and information, to comply with a 
legal obligation where processing by the controller is required for the performance of a task carried out in the 
public interest or in the exercise of official authority, for reasons of public interest regarding public health; for 
archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes; and for 
the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims.
  
349 C-507/17, Google v. CNIL and C-136/17, G.C. and Others v. CNIL.  
350 Article 20 of the GDPR. See also Article 29 Data Protection Working Party “Guidelines on the Right to 







personal data to the data controller,
351
 the processing is based on consent or contract,
352
 and 
the processing is executed through automated means.
353
 If the request for portability 
complies with these conditions, data controllers must ensure that the data is made available to 






5.2.2.6 Data Protection by Design and Default 
 
 
The concept of privacy by design means that the design, development or creation of new 
technologies must incorporate data privacy protection from the outset of the design of ICT 
processing systems. The ICO stated that the GDPR now codifies privacy by design which 
was previously a good practice measure under the 1995 EU Directive.
355
 Privacy by design 
is a valuable innovative obligation in the GDPR which is a preventative measure to enhance 
data privacy protection by ensuring that technologies used to process personal data are 
designed to incorporate controls to mitigate the risks of unlawful processing. This 
precautionary approach aims to deal with the challenges posed by new technologies and 
adapts data protection law to technological developments.
356 
 
Article 25 of the GDPR obliges data controllers to implement appropriate technical and 
organisational measures to give effect to the data protection principles as well as to integrate 
safeguards into the processing to comply with the requirements of the GDPR, thereby 
protecting the rights of the data subject. However, Bygrave identifies certain flaws in Article 
25 including vagueness, the complexity of the language used, the failure of the provision to 
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353 Article 20(1)(b) of the GDPR.  
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data portability’ 6/EN WP 242 rev.01 adopted on 13 December 2016 available at 
https://iapp.org/media/pdf/resource_center/WP29-2017-04-data-portability-guidance.pdf, accessed on 12  
September 2019, where it was explained that the notion of data portability “empowers data subjects to move, 
copy or transmit personal data easily from one IT environment to another.”  
355 ICO ‘Data protection by design and default’ available at https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-
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protection-by-design-and-default/, accessed on 10 November 2019.  
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Encryption is an example of data protection by design, which encodes messages to be 
accessible by authorised users only. An example of data protection by default is the creation 
of privacy-friendly settings on social media networks which limit the accessibility of user 
profiles so that they cannot be accessed, by default, by an indefinite number of natural 
persons. Proof of compliance with the requirements of Article 25 is linked to the certification 
mechanisms provided for in Article 42 of the GDPR.
358 
 
5.2.2.7 Regulation of Online Privacy 
 
 
The current ePrivacy Directive in the EU, which only applies to personal data processed in 
relation to electronic communications services in public communication networks, provides a 
greater degree of data privacy, regardless of the type of technology used. For instance, the 
ePrivacy Directive requires EU member states to ensure that consent is obtained from a user 
before cookies can be stored or accessed from his or her smartphone, computer or any other 
device connected to the internet. It also applies to tracking technology and direct marketing. 
In January 2017, the EC issued a proposal for an ePrivacy Regulation
359
 which aims to 
replace the ePrivacy Directive and to complement the GDPR. The POPIA, in its current form, 











The DPA largely codifies the GDPR into UK law but contains allowable derogations in 




357 LA Bygrave ‘Data Protection by Design and by Default: Deciphering the EU’s Legislative Requirements’  
(2017) 4 Oslo Law Review 11.  
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protection seals and marks.
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GDPR which supplement the GDPR, whilst Part 2, Chapter 3 contains applied GDPR 
provisions. Therefore, key differences between the DPA and the GDPR were enacted in 
contemplation of the British Government’s exit (“Brexit”) from the EU. The DPA was 
developed to maintain the GDPR data protection regime post the UK’s exit.
360
 The UK 
exited the EU on 31 January 2020.
361
 In terms of the Withdrawal Agreement and Political 
Declaration
362
 agreed to between the EU and the UK following the latter’s exit, unless 
extended, a transition phase runs up to 31 December 2020
363
 during which time EU law, 
including the GDPR will remain applicable to the UK. The UK courts will continue to apply 
the CJEU’s decisions and any amendments to EU law during the transition phase. Basically 
during the transition phase, the UK will continue to function as an EU member state without 
restriction on data transfers and the ICO will remain a supervisory authority. 
 
 
5.3.2 The UK Data Protection Regime 
 
 
After the GDPR came into force in all EU member states with effect from 25 May 2018, the 
UK Government elected to pass the DPA in 2018, which contains derogations, adaptations 
and exemptions from the GDPR.
364
 As a third generation data protection statute, the DPA 
repealed the Data Protection Act of 1998 in its entirety.
365
 The DPA governs the processing 
of personal data relating to individuals by public and private bodies, intelligence services and 













https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52017PC0010, accessed on 2 December 
2019.  
360
 European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2018/16/contents/enacted, accessed on 04 November 2019. 
361 See the UK Government’s website available at https://www.gov.uk/brexit, accessed on 16 November 2019.  
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https://wp.me/p6OBGR-3dP, accessed on 04 November 2019. 
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Part 2, Chapter 2 together with Schedules 1 to 3 of the DPA contain the derogations 
allowed by the GDPR.
367
 With a specific focus on the digital environment, the DPA contains 







The GDPR requires that a child of 16 should consent to data processing for the purposes of 
the provision of information society services (ISS), whilst the DPA sets the age at 13. The 
explanatory note to the DPA 2018 clarifies that this derogation is “in line with the minimum 
age set by Facebook, WhatsApp and Instagram.”
369
 On 12 April 2019, the ICO drafted and 
released a ‘Code of Practice for Age appropriate design’ for comment which targets online 
services and provides guidelines for the design standards for ISS when processing personal 
data that will likely be accessed by children.
370
 McCullagh argues that this Code of Practice 
is likely to pose challenges for ISS in setting up parental consent mechanisms to demonstrate 
that they implemented appropriate technical measures to verify a child’s age, which may 




5.3.2.2. Definition of ‘identifier’ 
 
 
The GDPR has a more detailed and expansive meaning of ‘identifier’ in the definition of 
personal data than the DPA. The GDPR makes it clearer that personal data extends to an 
online identifier such as IP addresses and cookies, which reflects technological changes in the 
processing or collection of personal information. The DPA merely includes reference to an 
‘online identifier’ in the term ‘identifiable living individual’ without expanding on the 









367 See note 309 above.  
368 Section 9 of the DPA. See also Article 4(25) of the GDPR for a definition of ‘Information society services’.  
369 Data Protection Act 2018 Explanatory Notes 23 available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2018/12/pdfs/ukpgaen_20180012_en.pdf, accessed on 15 November 2019.  
370 The draft Code of Practice is available at https://ico.org.uk/media/about-the-ico/consultations/2614762/age-
appropriate-design-code-for-public-consultation.pdf, accessed on 11 November 2019.  






5.3.2.3 Penalties for breaches 
 
 
The DPA creates criminal offences for breaches which are similar to the old DPA. It builds 
on the old regime by introducing a new criminal offence to deal with emerging issues, such as 
re-identifying anonymised or pseudonymised personal data.
372
 The rationale for creating this 
offence is informed by the UK’s Digital Strategy.
373
 The penalty for such an offence on 
conviction is a fine which is not limited to a maximum amount.
374
 The DPA also extends 
liability to the directors of a corporate body or to partners in a partnership.
375
 In this way, it 
has a wider scope than the GDPR. However, the downside is that the DPA does not impose 
imprisonment as a penalty for conviction of an offence. 
 
 
5.4 NEW ZEALAND 
 
 
5.4.1 An Overview of Statutory Data Protection in New Zealand 
 
 
The NZ Bill of Rights
376
 does not contain a freestanding right to privacy. However, it 
includes unlawful search and seizure protection for individuals.
377
 The Privacy Act regulates 
the protection of data privacy in NZ in relation to the use, collection and disclosure of 
personal information held by private and public sector agencies. The objective of the Privacy 
Act is to afford protection to individual privacy in general accordance with the OECD 
Guidelines.
378
 The Act only applies to the protection of living natural persons and excludes 
protection of juristic entities or deceased individuals.
379 
 
The Privacy Act contains 12 Information Privacy Principles (IPPs)
380
 which create 
rights for individuals and obligations for agencies
381
 to collect, access, store, retain, correct, 
 
 
372 Section 171 read with section 196(2) of the DPA.  
373 Data Protection Act 2018 Explanatory Notes (note 369 above) 18.  
374 Section 196(2) of the DPA.  
375 Section 198 of the DPA.  
376 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 available at 
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1990/0109/latest/DLM224792.html, accessed on 01 November 2019. 
The Preamble to the NZ Bill of Rights merely affirms the protection of human rights and commitment to the  
ICCPR. 
377 Ibid at section 21.  
378 Preamble of the Privacy Act.  
379 Section 2(1) of the Privacy Act.  
380 Part 2 of the Privacy Act.  
381 An ‘agency’ is defined in section 2(1)(a) of the Privacy Act as “any person or body of persons, whether 
corporate or unincorporated, and whether in the public sector or the private sector; and, for the avoidance of 








secure and disclose personal information. A breach of any of the IPPs or non-compliance 
with a code of practice by an agency amounts to interference with data privacy, which affords 
an individual the right to lodge a complaint with the Commissioner.
382
 In terms of such 
complaints, Butler observes that the Privacy Act sets a high threshold because “mere misuse 
or dissemination of personal information is insufficient for a complaint to be upheld.”
383
 One 
advantage of the Privacy Act is that the Commissioner is required to carry out periodic 
review of the Act at intervals of not more than five years.
384 
 
The Privacy Act is enforced by the Commissioner that is granted the wide functions set 
out in section 13.
385
 The Commissioner is described as a ‘watchdog’ for data privacy 
incursions arising from policy or legislation,
386
 and plays an instrumental role in providing 
recommendations for data protection law reform, as discussed below. 
 
 
5.4.2 Reform of the Statutory Data Protection Regime 
 
 
In 2011, the NZ Law Commission completed a rigorous review of the Privacy Act, with the 
overall aim of modernising the Act.
387
 Key considerations included consistency with 
international privacy instruments and the data privacy laws of NZ’s trading partners as well 
as ensuring that the Privacy Act remains relevant and effective to withstand the challenges 
posed by technological developments.
388
 The impact of technologies on data privacy were 
extensively discussed in Chapter 10 of the Stage 4 Report.
389
 Six recommendations were 




382 Section 66 of the Privacy Act.  
383 P Butler ‘The Case for a Right to Privacy in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act’ (2013) 11 NZJPIL 213.  
384 Section 26 of the Privacy Act.  
385 Specific functions in relation to monitoring technological developments are discussed in Chapter 4.  
386 Ibid at 221.  
387 The review commenced in 2006 and consisted of a four-stage process. Notably, Stage 1 focussed 
specifically on the privacy values, the impact of technology and international trends, whilst Stage 4, in 
particular, reviewed the Privacy Act and contained 136 key recommendations for reform.
  
388 Law Commission’s Review of the Privacy Act 1993: Stage 4 (Report 123) (note 252 above) at 1.15.  
389 Ibid at 249.  
390 Ibid at 22. The Law Commission’s Review Report’s recommendations in relation to technology can be 
summarised as follows: -
 
 
(1) “The word ‘computer’ be deleted from section 13(1)(n)”;  
(2) The IPPs should be retained but reviewed every five years to ensure that the Privacy Act responds 
effectively to data privacy issues raised by technological advancements;  
(3) A Privacy by Design Expert Panel, to be formed by the Commissioner, should be considered to promote 
data privacy by design and create awareness of the use of privacy enhancing technologies;  
(4) Adoption by NZ of a policy providing direction on compiling a privacy impact assessment;  
(5) Guidance on privacy impact assessments in the public sector should be provided and published on the State 








Although the review extensively considered the challenges that technological 
developments pose to data protection, the Law Commission’s recommendations did not 
require that enhanced protection provisions be included in the new legislation. For instance, 
in respect of the concept of privacy by design, the Law Commission recommended that the 
Privacy Commissioner should consider setting up a Privacy by Design Panel of experts to 
promote and further privacy by design and to create awareness of PETs. 
 
 
The new Privacy Bill was introduced in Parliament on 20 March 2018. It incorporates 
the majority of the Law Commission’s recommendations and also includes some of the 
recommendations arising from the review initiated by the Commissioner in 2016, that was 
conducted in accordance with section 26 of the Privacy Act.
391
 To keep pace with the current 
digital climate, the Commissioner recommended that law reform encompass further changes, 
including amongst others, introducing a higher civil penalty ($1 million for organisations and 
$100,000 for individuals) who seriously breach their obligations to be imposed in cases of 
severe privacy breaches, protection of an individual against unexpected identification from 
data that has been anonymised and the introduction of the data portability right.
392 
 
In its submissions on the Privacy Bill once released for comment, the Commissioner 
highlighted that the Bill is not adequate in the light of the data-driven economy due to 
developments in data science and information technology. For NZ data protection law to be 
considered adequate, comprehensive and fit for purpose in the digital economy, the 
Commissioner proposed that additional reform be included in the Privacy Bill including the 
right to re-identification, the right to data portability, and the right to erasure, algorithmic 
transparency and automated decision-making. 
 
 
The NZ Human Rights Commission (“HC”) also made submissions on the Privacy Bill. 







(6) The Commissioner should consider issuing a code of practice or guidance governing the use 
and processing of biometrics.  
391 Privacy Commissioner’s ‘Briefing for the Incoming Minister of Justice: Hon Andrew Little Office of 
the Privacy Commissioner’ dated October 2017 available at https://privacy.org.nz/assets/Uploads/Briefing-for-
Incoming-Minister-October-2017.pdf, accessed on 01 November 2019. 






approach to affirming and protecting privacy and human rights.”
393
 The HC criticised the 
Bill for not making reference to any freestanding right to privacy and called for consistency 
between the GDPR and the Privacy Bill, asserting that the GDPR addresses the emerging 
challenges to the right to privacy and is far more advanced than the Privacy Bill in 
responding to the current technological climate. The HC further proposed that the Privacy 
Bill should be substantially aligned to the data protection rights contained in the GDPR, 
including the right to erasure, the right to data portability, the concept of privacy by design 
and the rights in relation to automated decision making and profiling. 
 
 
The Privacy Bill seeks to modernise the Privacy Act mainly by affording the 
Commissioner with more enforcement powers and by including more severe penalties for 
non-compliance.
394
 Notably, it does not incorporate the additional law reform 












 New Zealand Human Rights Commission ‘Submission on the Privacy Bill’ 3 available at 
https://www.hrc.co.nz/files/1115/4042/8222/Human_Rights_Commission_Submission_on_the_Privacy_Bill_-
__24_May_2018.pdf, accessed on 30 November 2019.  
394 The key changes to the NZ data privacy legal regime introduced by the Privacy Bill are summarised as 
follows:
  
(1) cloud service providers and information transmitted overseas for storage and processing on behalf of an 
agency fall within clause 8 of the Privacy Bill which holds an agency accountable for information held 
by another agency as its agent;  
(2) agencies are required to issue mandatory data breach notifications by reporting data breaches to the 
Commissioner and the individual affected as soon as reasonably practicable
394
 in instances where the 
breach has caused or there is a risk for causing harm clause
394
 to the data subject. Failure to comply 
with the mandatory breach notification requirement is an offence for which a maximum fine of $10,000 
can be levied against the infringing agency. In addition, the Commissioner can name and shame the 
infringing agency by publishing its identity if it is in the public interest to do so;  
(3) compliance notices can be issued by the Commissioner to direct an agency to refrain or commit an act 
to demonstrate compliance with the Privacy Act. The process to issue the compliance notice is set out 
in the Privacy Bill.
394
 The Human Rights Review Tribunal will then enforce the notice or consider an 
appeal by the agency served with the notice and can direct that the agency complies with the notice or 
take action to remedy the breach.
394
 A fine of up to $10,000 can be levied against the agency for 
failure to comply with an order;  
(4) the Commissioner’s information-gathering powers are expanded by the Privacy Bill, empowering it to 
issue binding decisions on access to information requests by data subjects. The Commissioner is 
empowered to issue a directive to an agency to make the information requested available to the data 
subject within a timeframe up to the discretion of the Commissioner, which may be shorter than the 
default timeline of 20 working days.
394
 The penalty for non-compliance with the Commissioner’s 
directive on the information request will attract a maximum fine of $10,000; and  
(5) two new criminal offences are introduced, namely, misleading an agency to obtain access to another 
person’s personal information
394
 and destruction of a document containing personal data, knowing that 
a request has been made for it.
394






5.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 
Greenleaf asserts that “[D]ata protection laws outside Europe already converge on more than 
 
½ of the higher standards that have been required in Europe since the 1990s.” The GDPR is 
regarded as a ‘gold standard’ by certain countries to reform their data protection as it is 





It is clear that the GDPR sets high standards to enhance data privacy protection reform 
in the ever-evolving digital world. Although the UK is exiting the EU, it cannot depart from 
the protection afforded by the GDPR and has taken legislative steps to ensure that its 
domestic data protection regime is aligned to the GDPR. To some extent, NZ has attempted 
to reform its data protection regime to take the GDPR into account; however technologically 
robust data protection requirements have been excluded in the Privacy Bill. 
 
 
The POPIA should be amended to include a similar periodic review mechanism as 
provided for in the Privacy Act, which is critical to ensure that the POPIA remains adequate 
and effective in a rapidly evolving technological environment. The POPIA should be aligned 
to the GDPR to provide a ‘like-for-like’ level of protection for SA, especially because the 

























substantial increase on the current penalties imposed by the Privacy Act amounting to fines of up to 
$2,000.  
395
 G. Greenleaf ‘The Influence of European Data Privacy Standards Outside Europe: Implications for 












The 4IR has brought data privacy challenges into the limelight at both national and 
international levels. In light of these challenges, this research investigated the adequacy of the 
South African data protection regulatory regime to uphold data privacy with a particular 
focus on the Information Regulator’s mandate to monitor technological developments to 
mitigate the adverse effects thereof on data privacy protection. Data privacy challenges 
caused by technological advancements are of international concern due to the borderless 
nature of the technologies used to collect, store or transmit personal data globally. The 
research thus took into account the technological foresight activities of well-established 
foreign DPAs and the reform of data protection legislation in the EU, the UK and NZ. In 
order for the POPIA to remain relevant, adequate and effective in the digital age, this Chapter 
sets out recommendations for consideration by the Information Regulator to enhance the 






A key feature of this research was an analysis of the Information Regulator’s mandate 
to monitor developments in technology to mitigate its adverse effects on the protection of 
personal information. Since the POPIA has not yet entered into force and effect, it was 
critical to examine the technological foresight work conducted by well-established foreign 
DPAs in the UK and NZ to determine if SA can learn any lessons from these jurisdictions. In 




Turning to the technological foresight monitoring work of foreign DPAs, the NZ 
Commissioner and UK’s ICO
396
 take a proactive rather than a reactive stance when 
monitoring technological developments. The activities undertaken by these foreign DPAs can 
serve as sound guidelines for the Information Regulator to plan or structure its technological 












Information Regulator to gather expertise in the ICT field to keep abreast of the impact of 
new technologies on data privacy. 
 
 
It has been 15 years since the SALRC launched its investigation into the protection of 
data privacy and since then there has been a shift in the global digital landscape, with 
significant implications for data privacy protection. SA will therefore need to keep pace with 
developments in international best practices. Foreign jurisdictions, such as NZ, the EU and 




The analysis of the EU data protection regime demonstrated that the EU Directive was 
repealed in its entirety by the GDPR largely because it lacked substance to protect data 
privacy in the digital age. This research focussed on the novelty provisions of the GDPR 
encompassing enhanced rights for data subjects and the obligations imposed on data 
controllers to prevent data privacy infringement occasioned by the use of technology.
397
 The 
POPIA does not specifically deal with these novelty provisions. Unlike SA, the EU also 
regulates online privacy through the ePrivacy Directive. Furthermore, the extra-territorial 
application of the GDPR has implications for South African businesses.
398
 Scholars refer to 
the GDPR as a ‘gold standard’ for countries to reform their data protection as it is recognised 
as international best practice. 
 
 
Since the POPIA was largely premised on the EU Directive, it is important that it be 
reformed in line with the provisions discussed in Chapter 5, paragraph 5.2 above. The 
additional reforms adopted by the UK and NZ that afford data subjects enhanced protection 
of personal information should also be taken into account. Although there is no one-size-fits 
approach to regulatory reform, taking into account that risks associated with technological 






















6.3.1 Recommendations for Technological Foresight 
 
 
Section 47(7) of the POPIA only requires the Information Regulator to appoint a person with 
specialist knowledge temporarily or to assist on a particular matter. It is submitted that 
successful technological foresight activities require that technical expertise form part of the 
Information Regulator’s structure since data protection as a whole and ICT expertise, in 
particular, have been described as “moving targets” due to existing new technologies and the 
rapid rate at which emerging technologies are likely to increase. Alternatively, in the short 
term, the Information Regulator should adopt the ICO’s “intelligence hub” model to gather 
information and intelligence from various sources, such as academics, journalists and 
technologists. In the long term the Information Regulator may elect to set up a panel of 
experts in line with its independence so that it can respond promptly to the dynamic privacy 
and technological environment. 
 
 
Notwithstanding that the POPIA is a technologically neutral piece of legislation, it is 
recommended that, like the ICO, the Information Regulator should develop binding codes of 
conduct to regulate the use of certain technologies so that any breach thereof will trigger the 
penalty system to enforce the data subject’s rights.
399 
 
As educator, in creating awareness of the lawful processing conditions of personal 
information through its Outreach and Research Committee, the Information Regulator should 
ensure that the Public Awareness Strategy specifically includes, as a standing item, the recent 
types of technological developments which impact data privacy rights so as to create 




To remain at the forefront of technological developments, it is also submitted that the 
Information Regulator should participate as an active member in international forums which deal 
with technology impacting data privacy matters.
400
 The Regulator should also focus on a 
 
 
398 See discussion in Chapter 5, paragraph 5.2.2.2.  
399 See discussion in Chapter 4, paragraphs 4.2.1.  
400 Such as the International Working Group on Data Protection in Telecommunications, the Internet Privacy 








technology strategy as adopted by the DPAs in NZ and the UK by setting out specific 
technology goals to tackle new technologies or disruptive business models and address how 
these could be regulated in certain sectors. 
 
 
6.3.2 Recommendations for Reform 
 
 
The concept of privacy by design
401
 is a valuable innovative obligation in the GDPR which 
is a preventative measure to enhance data privacy protection by ensuring that technologies 
used to process personal data are designed to incorporate controls to mitigate the risks of 
unlawful processing. Technology impedes free and informed consent and the use of 
technology such as Big Data allows personal data to be reused outside the purpose limitation 
for which consent was obtained. The function and significance of consent as a legal ground is 
therefore diluted.
402
 The POPIA does not include the design and default obligation to ensure 
that privacy safeguards are ‘built in’ to the technology from the design stage. The Information 
Regulator’s research strategy
403
 will need to take into account preventative measures to 
mitigate the impact of technology by focusing on data protection by design and default 
requirements. To promote PETs, the POPIA will need to be amended to explicitly include 
privacy by design and default as a standard obligation, as is currently regulated by the GDPR. 
 
In order to counter the negative effects of technology from the outset, it is 
recommended that provision be made design and default under the accountability condition of 
the POPIA. Alternatively, it is strongly recommended that the Information Regulator consider 
issuing a binding code of conduct that targets the manufacturers of technologies to ensure that 
privacy controls are embedded from the design stage (data protection by design and default) 
of the technologies. 
 
Regulation of the online environment, particularly in relation to electronic 
communications services in public communication networks, requires a higher degree of data 
privacy protection. In the EU, the ePrivacy Directive, which will be replaced by the ePrivacy 
Regulation to complement the GDPR, requires EU member states to ensure that consent is 
obtained from a user before cookies can be stored or accessed from his or her smartphone, 
computer or any other device connected to the internet. The protection afforded by the 
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current form, does not deal with online privacy at all and there is no specific legislation in SA 
dealing with such. It is recommended that Information Regulator consider the requirements 
of the ePrivacy Directive and the proposed ePrivacy Regulation and recommend to 
Parliament the enactment of specific legislation or amendment of the POPIA to regulate 
online privacy in a holistic manner. 
 
Given that the POPIA was premised on the provisions of the 1995 EU Directive, it would 
be remiss for the Information Regulator not to take into account the provisions of the GDPR 
when reforming data protection law in SA to counter the negative effects of rapid 
technological developments. It is strongly recommended that a holistic approach to data 
protection law reform in SA should be adopted and that the POPIA should be amended to 
include the following key GDPR provisions to afford a higher degree of protection of data 
privacy: 
 
(a) The POPIA should incorporate the GDPR identifiability criterion, extending the 
POPIA application to all forms of data identifying a data subject, whether directly or 




(b) To afford like-for-like protection to data subjects and considering that some 
technologies process personal data outside of SA, the POPIA should also create an 
extraterritorial scope of application, subject to similar limitations imposed by the 
GDPR; 
 
(c) To align the POPIA to the online reality, the definition of ‘personal information’ 
should be aligned to the GDPR definition of ‘personal data’ by extending the 
definition to include the ‘online identifier’ and ‘location data’; 
 
(d) The term ‘processing’ in the POPIA should be expanded as defined in Article 4 of the 
 
GDPR so that operations on personal data, continued storage thereof and/or further 
processing by automated technologies such as Blockchain, cloud computing, 
Artificial Intelligence or machine learning fall squarely within the definition of 
processing and are therefore subject to the conditions for the lawful processing of 
personal information; 
 
(e) The POPIA should include the GDPR requirements for consent and further include an 
obligation on the responsible party to prove that the data subject has consented to the 
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(f) To enhance data protection rights and afford greater control of the movement or 
transmission of personal data, the POPIA should be amended to include the right to 




(g) The specific rights afforded in terms of the right to be forgotten provide internet users 
with better control of the use and accuracy of their personal data. Accordingly, it is 
submitted that section 24 of the POPIA should be more explicit to afford data subjects 
the right to request the erasure or further processing of their personal information held 
by responsible parties as provided for in Article 17 of the GDPR. 
 
 
As noted in the NZ Privacy Bill, “since computers have become sufficiently ubiquitous as 
to need no reference and such reference” may have “the adverse effect of appearing to 
exclude other technologies”, it is recommended that the word ‘computer’ should be removed 
from the Information Regulator’s technology monitoring function to avoid excluding other 
technologies and to ensure that it is broad enough to cover all forms of technologies used to 
process personal information. 
 
 
Finally, due to the technologically sensitive nature of data protection law, it is 
recommended that the POPIA should include a similar periodic review mechanism as 
provided for in the Privacy Act, which is an important provision to ensure that the POPIA 
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